Constitutional Architecture: The First
Amendment and the Single Family
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The Article argues that the exterior design of a private single-family
house is a First Amendment-protected expression for the inhabitants. When a municipality applies aesthetic standards to regulate
this expression, it must justify its regulation by establishing a
substantial governmental interest; that interest must be advanced by
application of narrowly and clearly defined standards.
INTRODUCTION

In January, 1991, Margaret P. Gilleo offended the aesthetic sensibilities of the City of Ladue, Missouri by placing "an 8.5- by 11-inch sign
in the second story window of her home stating, 'For Peace in the
Gulf. "' 1 The municipality responded by enacting an ordinance which,
with ten exceptions, prohibited all signs; the ordinance was based largely
on aesthetic concems. 2
• Associate Professor, Widener University Law School. B.A. Hope College,
1968; J.D. University of Michigan Law School, 1972; LL.M. Temple University Law
School, 1986. Thanks to my research assistant, Fred Karpf, Esq., Class of I 995, for
doggedly tracking down unusual sources; his puzzlement over my requests never
interfered with his professionalism in fulfilling them.
I. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (1994).
2. The city was animated by a fear that the:
proliferation of an unlimited number of signs ... would create ugliness, visual
blight and clutter, tarnish the natural beauty of the landscape as well as the
residential and commercial architecture, impair property values, substantially
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Ms. Gilleo challenged the ordinance. The United States District Court,
granting her motion for summary judgment, found that the ordinance
violated the First Amendment. 3 The Eighth Circuit agreed. 4 And, on
June 13, 1994, so did the Supreme Court which found, without dissent,
that "[a] special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been
part of our culture and our law ... ; that principle has special resonance
when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak
there." 5
The Court distinguished a municipality's "constant and
unavoidable" need to regulate expressive uses of public forums from its
"much less pressing" need to regulate a citizen's expressive use of her
private house. 6
Although every court agreed that the municipality overreached itself
in pursuing Ms. Gilleo's little sign, its pursuit was founded on what has
become an acknowledged governmental interest: aesthetic regulation. As
the Supreme Court characterized it in Gilleo, the municipality relied
"squarely" on a "content-neutral justification for its ordinance" by
claiming that it promoted "aesthetic values unrelated to the content of
the prohibited speech."7
This Article will discuss the application of legislatively-defined
aesthetic values to the exterior design of a private single family house,
arguing that such regulation is subject to a rigorous First Amendment
review. Using the philosophy of architect Robert Venturi, this Article
will argue that the exterior design of the single family house speaks on
behalf of the inhabitants, expressing who they are and how they choose
to live. The Article argues that the content of this expression is made
as clearly as if written or spoken and is entitled to First Amendment
protection. Any municipality seeking to restrict that expression under

impinge upon the privacy and special ambience of the community, and may
cause safety and traffic hazards to motorists, pedestrians, and children.
Id. at 2041.
3. 774 F. Supp. 1564 (D. Mo. 1991).
4. 986 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1993).
5. 114 S. Ct. at 2047 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor filed a concurring
opinion because she "would have preferred to apply our normal analytical structure in
this case which may well have required us to examine this law with the scrutiny
appropriate to content-based regulations." Id. at 2048. However, she joined the Court's
opinion stating, "I agree with its conclusion ... that even if the restriction were contentneutral, it would still be invalid .... " Id.
6. Id. at 2047.
7. Id. at 2042. Not every court has been willing to assume that such ordinances
are content-neutral. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 63 U.S.L.W. 2724 (8th Cir.
1995), where the court found that another Missouri city's ordinance restricting the
posting of political signs for ostensibly aesthetic-based reasons was content-based; was,
therefore, subject to strict scrutiny; and, under that scrutiny, was invalid as imposing
unconstitutional restrictions of First Amendment rights.
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the guise of aesthetic regulation must establish a sufficiently substantial
need to do so under narrow, clearly defined standards.
Section I analyzes Gil/ea and the three Supreme Court decisions
underlying it, decisions which dealt with a municipality's authority to
regulate outdoor signs; each decision required at least a passing
discussion of aesthetic values as a legitimate regulatory interest. Section
II introduces Robert Venturi. Section III describes how the house itself,
in its exterior design, is a form of speech for the people who inhabit it,
a way of expressing who they are and how they choose to live. The
house is a form of individual expression which, section IV argues, is
entitled to First Amendment protection. Section V describes the genesis
of aesthetic regulation and its threat to First Amendment values. Section
VI suggests how those values can be protected from governmental
intrusion, arguing for a constitutional architecture which accepts the
value of variety in the exterior design of private single family houses.
I.

Ms. Gilleo's hanging of a little protest sign in the window of her
house had Supreme Court support, even as to its placement. On May
10, 1970, Harold Spence hung a United States flag from an upper floor
window of his apartment which was located on private property. 8 Mr.
Spence used tape to attach a peace symbol to the 3 by 5-foot flag which
he then hung upside down to protest the Cambodian invasion and the
Kent State killings, both of which had occurred a few days earlier. 9 Mr.
Spence was arrested and convicted for improperly using the United
States flag, a conviction affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court. 10
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mr. Spence's
"activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which
it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of
protected expression." 11 Mr. Spence used "a privately owned flag"
which was "displayed ... on private property" with no intent "to incite
violence or even stimulate a public demonstration." 12 Under these

8.
9.
10.
1 I.
12.

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974).
at 405-06, 408.
at 408.
at 409- 10.
at 408-09.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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circumstances, the Court said it "must examine with particular care the
interests advanced by [the state] to support its prosecution." 13
The state did not advance an interest which could sustain Mr. Spence's
conviction. He did not breach the peace. 14 He did not impose his
ideas on passersby; those "who might have been offended could easily
have avoided the display." 15 He could not "be punished for failing to
show proper respect for our national emblem." 16
The state was left with arguing that it had "an interest in preserving
the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country." 17 The Court,
assuming that this was a valid interest, still reversed the conviction
because Mr. Spence displayed his flag "as a flag of his country in a way
closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used
to convey ideas." 18 Mr. Spence's ideas were conveyed in a manner
which "was direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of
the First Amendment." 19
Although there are clear parallels between Mr. Spence's and Ms.
Gilleo's protests, the Supreme Court did not rely on Spence to support
its decision in Gilleo, perhaps because the state in Spence did not
advance an aesthetic interest in controlling the individual's conduct. 20
Instead, Gilleo relied on three decisions which had reviewed "the
constitutionality of municipal ordinances prohibiting the display of
certain outdoor signs"; 21 each decision required at least a passing
discussion of aesthetic values as a legitimate municipal regulatory
interest.
The first decision was Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro which presented "the question whether the First Amendment
permits a municipality to prohibit the posting of 'For Sale' or 'Sold'
signs" in an effort to reduce white-flight. 22 The Court, although
characterizing the ordinance as "enacted to achieve an important
governmental objective," found that it violated the First Amendment. 23

13. Id. at 411.
14. Id. at 412.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. ld.at415.
19. Id.
20. The Gil/eo Court did cite Spence in support of the principle which affords a
special respect for individual liberty in speaking at one's home, a place where the
municipality's need to regulate is much less pressing than in public forums. See Gilleo,
114 S. Ct. at 2047.
21. Id. at 2042.
22. 431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977).
23. Id. at 95.
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The Linmark Court began by reviewing decisions invalidating
advertising restrictions on abortion services and prescription drug prices,
noting that "the societal interest in 'the free flow of commercial
information' . . . is in no way lessened by the fact that the subject of the
commercial information here is realty rather than abortions or drugs."24
The municipality's argument that the ordinance only restricted one
method of communication was unavailing. The Court first responded
that "serious questions exist as to whether the ordinance 'leave[s] open
ample alternative channels for communication."'25 The alternatives
were more costly, involved less homeowner autonomy, were less likely
to reach a wide audience, and "may be less effective media for
communicating the message that is conveyed by a 'For Sale' sign in
front of the house to be sold."26
Second, the Court responded that the municipality was "not genuinely
concerned with the place of the speech--front lawns----or the manner of
the speech--signs." 27 The municipality did not seek "to promote
aesthetic values or any other value 'unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. "'28 The municipality did not seek "to restrict a mode of
communication that 'intrudes on the privacy of the home, ... [or] makes
it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure' .
29
• • •"
The municipality did not seek to control the place or manner
of speech which produced "a detrimental 'secondary effect' on
society. " 30
What the municipality had sought to do was proscribe "particular
types of signs based on their content because it fears their 'primary'
effect----that they will cause those receiving the information to act upon
it." 31 The municipality sought to proscribe information "of vital
interest to ... residents, since it may bear on one of the most important
decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their
families." 32 The municipality could not, under the First Amendment,

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
3 I.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 92 (citation omitted).
at 93 (alteration in original).

at 94.
at 96.
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"restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise
homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the [municipality]
views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interests of the
[municipality]: they will choose to leave town." 33
The second sign decision relied on in Gilleo was Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, a decision which Justice Rehnquist likened to
"judicial clangor," a "virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive
principles can be clearly drawn."34 The municipality, acting to reduce
traffic hazards and improve aesthetics, banned fixed-structure, off-site
signs containing either commercial or non-commercial communication;
it permitted on-site commercial advertising. 35 Companies engaged in
the outdoor advertising business claimed, among other claims, that the
ordinance was invalid on its face under the First Amendment.
The Court's plurality opinion began by noting that "[e]ach method of
communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the
'differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers' of each method";
Metromedia dealt "with the law of billboards."36 The plurality described billboards as "a well-established medium of communication, used
to convey a broad range of different kinds of messages" on large,
permanent structures designed to stand out from their surroundings. 37
Such structures create "a unique set of problems for land-use planning
and development." 38 Government can regulate the non-communicative
aspects of billboards but when that regulation "impinges to some degree
on the communicative aspects, ..." the courts must "reconcile the
government's regulatory interests with the individual's right to expression."39
That reconciliation was made more difficult by the banning of both
off-site commercial and off- or on-site non-commercial communication.
As to the former, the plurality applied this four part test:
(I) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise
protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a
substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interestb and (4)
reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 4

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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Id.
453 U.S. 490, 569-70 (1981).
Id. at 493-96.
Id. at 501 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)).
Id. at 501-02.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 507.
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The Metromedia plurality quickly disposed of the first, second, and
fourth criteria. In particular, the plurality said it was "far too late to
contend" that traffic safety and aesthetics are other than substantial
governmental interests. 41 The plurality then found that the third
criterion was satisfied, expressing a reluctance "to disagree with the
accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers . . . that
billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety."42 Similarly, the plurality said it was "not speculative to recognize that billboards
by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be
perceived as an 'esthetic harm"'; however, these "esthetic judgments are
necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason
must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public
rationalization of an impermissible purpose."43 The plurality found that
"insofar as [the ordinance] regulates commercial speech ... " it passed
constitutional muster. 44
Not so, however, in its prohibition of on-site billboards used for noncommercial communication. Although the municipality could distinguish
between on- and off-site commercial communication, it did "not have the
same range of choice in the area of non-commercial speech to evaluate
the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative interests."45 Simply put, the municipality could not "choose the appropriate
subjects for public discourse."46 Because it had attempted to do so, it
reached "too far into the realm of protected speech . . . " and the
ordinance was, according to the plurality, "unconstitutional on its
face." 47
Now arose the clangor of which Justice Rehnquist complained.
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, concluded
that the municipality "failed to provide adequate justification for its
substantial restriction on protected activity."48 Unlike the plurality,

41. Id. at 507-08.
42. Id. at 509.
43. Id. at 510. The Court noted that "there is no claim in this case that San Diego
has as an ulterior motive the suppression of speech, and the judgment involved here is
not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself." Id.
44. Id. at 512.
45. Id. at 514.
46. Id. at 515.
47. Id. at 521.
48. Id. at 528.
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which hesitated to question the municipality's accumulated judgments,
these justices were not "so quick to accept legal conclusions in other
cases as an adequate substitute for evidence in this case that banning
billboards directly furthers traffic safety."49 Nor were these Justices so
quick to accept the municipality's judgment on aesthetics, a judgment
which "may not be exercised in contravention of the First Amendment"50:
Of course, it is not for a court to impose its own notion of beauty on San
Diego. But before deferring to a city's judgment, a court must be convinced
that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns
with respect to its environment. Here, San Diego has failed to demonstrate a
comprehensive coordinated effort in its commercial and industrial areas to
address other obvious contributors to an unattractive environment."

That showing was indispensible "where, as here, there is an infringement
of important constitutional consequence."52
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, was persuaded that "a wholly
impartial total ban on billboards would be permissible."53 He thus
found it "difficult to understand why the exceptions in San Diego's
ordinance present any additional threat to the interests protected by the
First Amendment." 54 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, found that the
city has the authority to "protect its citizens' legitimate interests in traffic
safety and the environment by eliminating distracting and ugly structures
from its buildings and roadways, to define which billboards actually pose
that danger, and to decide whether, in certain instances, the public's need
for information outweighs the dangers perceived."55 Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, agreed "substantially" with the Chief Justice and Justice
Stevens, regretting that "none of the views expressed in the other
opinions . . . come close enough to mine to warrant the necessary
compromise to obtain a Court opinion." 56
Three years later, the Court acted to mute the Metromedia clangor in
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 57 the third sign
decision relied on in Gilleo. A municipal ordinance prohibited signposting on public property. Again, the question was whether this

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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Id.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 569-70.
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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abridged the First Amendment. The Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Stevens, decided that it did not.
The Court found that the ordinance, as written and as applied, was "a
viewpoint-neutral regulation ...." 58 Since the parties agreed that the
municipality could constitutionally "attempt to improve its appearance,
..." an interest which "is basically unrelated to the suppression of
ideas", the Court asked "whether that interest is sufficiently substantial
to justify the effect of the ordinance on [the citizens'] expression, and
whether that effect is no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's
purpose." 59
The Vincent Court, reconciling the plurality and dissenting opinions
in Metromedia, "reaffirmed" what it .characterized as Metromedia s
majority conclusion: "The problem addressed by this ordinance-the
visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property--constitutes a significant
substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit."60 The Vincent
Court also concluded that the prohibition was properly tailored to
address this evil. 61
Again using Metromedia as if it sang in harmony rather than rang in
clangor, the Vincent Court said that "[a]s is true of billboards, the
esthetic interests that are implicated by temporary signs are presumptively at work in all parts of the city," interests that "are both psychological
and economic."62 Those interests were "sufficiently substantial to
justify this content-neutral, impartially administered prohibition against
the posting of ... temporary signs on public property"; that "application
of the ordinance does not create an unacceptable threat to the 'profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should

58. Id. at 804.
59. Id. at 805.
60. Id. at 807.
61. See id. at 810.
With respect to [the] signs posted ... it is the tangible medium of expressing
the message that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape.
. . . Here, the substantive evil-visual blight-is not merely a possible
byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself.
. . . [T]he application of the ordinance in this case responds precisely to the
substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The ordinance
curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.

Id.
62.

Id. at 817.
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be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. "'63 In what would be a significant aside for Ms. Gilleo, the Court suggested that
the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property
is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The
private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the
disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations, a
significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is
preserved, and private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep the posting
of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. 64

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented
in Vincent, finding the Court's analysis "seriously inadequate" because
it "failed to develop a reliable means of gauging the nature or the depth
of the City's commitment to pursuing the goal of eradicating 'visual
clutter. "'65 The dissent characterized the Court's review of the
ordinance as "cursory" and overly deferential to the municipality's
aesthetic judgment. 66 The dissent argued that "it is only when aesthetic
regulation is addressed in a comprehensive and focused manner that we
can ensure that the goals pursued are substantial and that the manner in
which they are pursued is no more restrictive of speech than is
necessary."67
These three sign decisions---Linmark, Metromedia, and Vincent---provided the foundation for the Court's analysis in Gilleo. The
three decisions established that although signs were a form of protected
expression, "they pose distinctive problems that are subject to
municipalities' police powers. "68 Using that analysis, the municipality
in Gilleo argued that its ordinance prohibiting the hanging of a small
protest sign from the second floor window of Ms. Gilleo's private house
was based on the "content-neutral justification" of promoting "aesthetic
values unrelated to the content of the prohibited speech."69
The Gilleo Court began by assuming that the ordinance was "free of
impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination"; it also noted the

63. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964)).
64. Id. at 811. The Gilleo Court also stated that,
[i]t bears mentioning that individual residents themselves have strong
incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent "visual clutter"
in their own yards and neighborhoods-incentives markedly different from
those of persons who erect signs on others' land, in others' neighborhoods, or
on public property. Residents' self-interest diminishes the danger of the
"unlimited" proliferation of residential signs that concerns the City of Ladue.
114 S. Ct. at 2047.
65. 466 U.S. at 827.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 830-31.
68. Gilleo, I I4 S. Ct. at 204 I.
69. Id. at 2042.
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municipality's "concededly valid" interest "in minimizing the visual
clutter associated with signs." 70 That interest, however, was "no more
compelling than the interests at stake in Linmark:' and the "impact on
free communication" was "manifestly greater." 71 Linmark's ordinance
"applied only to a form of commercial speech"; the City of Ladue's
ordinance applied to "even such absolutely pivotal speech as a sign
protesting an imminent governmental decision to go to war." 72
The Gilleo Court also distinguished Vincent. The means of communication at issue in Vincent-"signs placed on public property"-were not
unique nor did the ordinance bar the taxpayers from using other means
of effective communication. 73 However, Ladue's ordinance "almost
completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both
unique and important."74 Residential signs like Ms. Gilleo's "have long
been an important and distinct medium of expression" which can "both
reflect and animate change in the life of a community."75 Ladue's
ordinance had "closed off' an important medium of speech for which
there was no adequate substitute. 7 And, as the Court added, "a person
who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to reach neighbors, an
audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means."77
When added to the previous sign cases, Gilleo demonstrates that a
municipality, acting to promote an aesthetic interest by an ordinance
which is content-neutral toward the regulated expression, may still
transgress the First Amendment by unduly foreclosing an effective
opportunity to transmit that expression, especially when a private citizen
uses private property to make a non-commercial statement. This Article,
using the writings and buildings of Robert Venturi, will argue that the
privately owned single-family house is itself a statement, an expression
Id. at 2044-45.
Id. at 2045.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2046.
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text
and picture by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs
provide information about the identity of the "speaker" .... [T]he identity of
the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
77.

Id.
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in its external design of the views and values of the inhabitants, an
expression which a municipality may aesthetically regulate only if it
establishes a sufficently substantial need to do so under narrow, clearly
defined standards.
The City of Ladue again provides an example of what is at stake. In
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, a Ladue ordinance established an
architectural review board authorized to approve building plans and
specifications. 78 The ordinance sought to ensure that buildings "conform to certain minimum architectural standards of appearance and
conformity with surrounding structures, and that unsightly, grotesque and
unsuitable structures ... be avoided, and that appropriate standards of
beauty and conformity be fostered and encouraged." 79
The Stoyanoffs applied for a permit to build a single-family house
which, although "unusual in design," complied with all building codes
and regulations. 80 The architectural review board refused to issue the
permit because, as the building commissioner stated, the house was "a
monstrosity of grotesque design, which would seriously impair the value
of property in the neighborhood." 81 The Stoyanoffs sued to compel
issuance of the permit. The trial court granted their motion for summary
judgment, a grant which was reversed on appeal.
The Missouri Supreme Court analyzed the ordinance in terms of its
effect on general welfare. Although the Stoyanoffs' proposed house did
"not descend to the 'patently offensive character of vehicle graveyards,"'
it was "a highly modernistic residence" proposed for an area "where
traditional Colonial, French Provincial, and English Tudor styles of
architecture are erected."82 The court said it was "certainly in keeping
with the ultimate ideal of general welfare" to "preserve and protect
existing areas in which structures of a general conformity of architecture
have been erected." 83 The court, characterizing the area under consideration as "clearly ... a fashionable one," quoted the following from a
Louisiana decision: "If by the term 'aesthetic consideration' is meant a
regard merely for outward appearances, for good taste in the matter of
beauty of the neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial

78.
79.
80.

458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
Id. at 306-07 (quoting Ordinance 131, which is at issue).
Id. at 306. Photographs of the proposed design showed "the residence to be

of a pyramid shape, with a flat top, and with triangular shaped windows or doors at one
or more comers." Id. at 308.
8 I. Id. at 307.
82. Id. at 310.

83.
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reason for saying that such a consideration is not a matter of general
welfare."84
The municipality entrusted a three-member board with the task of
determining whether the exterior design of a proposed house was in
good taste. The board's chair initially determined if the proposed house
conformed "to proper architectural standards in appearance and design,"
if it conformed to "the style and design of surrounding structures," and
if it was "conducive to the proper architectural development of the
city." 85 If the house so conformed, the board's chair approved the
application; if not, he referred it to the full board which would
"disapprove the application if it determines the proposed structure will
constitute an unsightly, grotesque, or unsuitable structure in appearance,
detrimental to the welfare of surrounding property or residents." 86
The Stoyanoffs argued that these standards were inadequate, clothing
the board with unreviewable discretion. The court disagreed, finding the
general standards "sufficient" and finding it proper to evaluate the
exterior design of a proposed house "with reference to the character of
the surrounding neighborhood and to the determination of any adverse
effect on the general welfare and preservation of property values of the
community."87
We do not know why the Stoyanoffs wanted to build their pyramidshaped house in a Queen Anne neighborhood other than the obvious:
they wanted to live in that house in that place. Perhaps they were early
New Age, finding a source of psychic power in pyramids; perhaps they
were avant-garde, wanting to express the virtues of a new type of
residential architecture; perhaps they were iconoclasts, attacking the staid
architectural beliefs of their neighbors; perhaps they just liked what the
design said. We just don't know.
What we do know is that the municipality prevented them from
expressing themselves through the exterior design of their house because
the municipality considered their expression grotesque and unsuitable
and a threat to what it regarded as its special ambience. Considerations
less offensive to the First Amendment underlay the same municipality's

84.
1923)).
85.
86.
87.

Id. (quoting State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440,444 (La.

Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 31 I.
Id. at 312.
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attempt to squelch Ms. Gilleo 's expression, an attempt which failed a
First Amendment review. The Stoyanoffs' expression should also have
received a First Amendment review under which the municipality would
not have been permitted to squelch their expression.
II.

In both Stoyanoff and Gilleo, the municipality used a legal aesthetics
standard to justify its actions, a standard which is difficult to define and
easy to abuse and, frankly, a pain for courts to analyze and evaluate
under traditional legal principles. Yet, as John Costonis, the leading
analyst of legal aesthetics, has forcefully argued, "we are condemned to
come to terms with aesthetics, whether we like it or not." 88 As he
noted, legal aesthetics "is a product of the tension between two sets of
values with different sources, goals, and legal champions." 89 It is not
a "blissful marriage." 9° Compounding the tension is architecture's
protean nature. Things change: new expressions gain currency, old
symbols are reevaluated, viewer perception is awakened, what was
thought absolute is seen as ambiguous. Stasis is not healthy.
Until the later 1960's and early 1970's, American architectural thought
was dominated by a modernist school, rigidly geometric, deliberately
unsymbolic. 91 That domination was challenged and ultimately overthrown, a rebellion instigated and continued by the words and work of
Robert Venturi. Beginning with his gentle manifesto, Complexity and
Contradiction in Architecture,92 Venturi "looked with fresh eyes at the

88. JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 15 (I 989). He added that lawmakers "must attend to these considerations
unless they are prepared to shut down land use regulation in its entirety." Id.
89. Id. at 36.
90. Id. He said "[a] blissful marriage of law and aesthetics assumes that end-state
values, newly received into the law by legislators and administrators, will respect
constitutionally based process values, whose ultimate guardians, of course, are the
judges." Id.
Another analyst has noted that the law itself "is a builder of worlds. Through
constitution-framing, legislation, and adjudication, law structures individuals into patterns
of rights and responsibilities. Decisionmakers conceive an image of legal reality that
becomes concrete through state enforcement." Laura S. Fitzgerald, Toward a Modern
Art of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 2051 (1987).
91. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 699, 791-92 ( 1993).
92. ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (2d
ed. I 977) [hereinafter COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION]; see also CHARLES JENCKS,
MODERN MOVEMENTS IN ARCHITECTURE 221-22 (1973).
Venturi's gentle manifesto has had an extraordinary impact in architectural
circles.... [H]is arguments for an "inclusive architecture" which can use any
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architectural landscape of America" and "challenged prevailing
thinking. "93 He changed "the course of architecture in this century,
allowing architects and consumers the freedom to accept inconsistencies
in form and pattern, to enjoy popular taste."94 He rediscovered and
publicized the content "of honest architectural meaning: forms that
mean something as a slope usually means a roof, ... " 95
Venturi, who (and whose work) is described as "urbane, cultured,
deeply responsive to history and art and unusually understanding of
existing values," has offered solutions, in his writing and his building,
which reflect "an extremely sophisticated, subtle, sympathetic, and
sometimes wry, sensibility."96 He provided "intellectual legitimacy and
depth" for what was an incipient dissatisfaction with architectural rigidity
and conformity; he intellectually and physically demonstrated how to
satisfy a need for a rich and varied architecture which celebrates irony
and metaphor and even vulgarity. 97 The Stoyanoffs might well have
elements whatever ... have effectively challenged the prevailing exclusivist
arguments for purity and restriction. . . . In a sense his polemic is directed
against the idea of an historicist sensibility which wants to restrict the
available metaphors to those which are only current or technologically up to
date. The idea is that in the age of travel and tourism, the age of the
"museum without walls", this restriction is no longer relevant and furthermore
that in any large city with its plurality of sub-cultures, such limitation is highly
paternalistic.

Id.
93. THE PRITZKER ARCHITECTURE PRIZE: 1991: PRESENTED TO ROBERT VENTURI
(Unpaged). The Pritzker Award is "architecture's rough equivalent of the Nobel Prize."
Paul Goldberger, Robert Venturi, Gentle Subverter ofModernism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1991, at H36.
94. THE PRITZKER ARCHITECTURE PRIZE, supra note 93.
95. Nathan Silver, Learning From Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1973, § 7 at
6, 7 (book review).
96. Ada L. Huxtable, The Venturi 'Anti-Style' of Architecture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1977, at 027.
97. Moshe Safdie, Private Jokes in Public Places, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
I 98 I, at 66; see also Christopher Mead, Introduction: The Meaning of "Both-And" in
Venturi 's Architecture, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI 3 (Christopher Mead
ed., 1989).
This shift from a search for the singular and abstractly homogeneous solution
to the study of multiple and actually heterogeneous solutions has both
informed the ongoing debate over what is significant in contemporary
architecture and made Venturi a symbol of the current confusion. . . . Such
an architect, and such an architecture, eludes the easy categorizations of
stylistic judgment and leaves one with the awkward certainty that his work
follows a coherent logic even if one cannot reduce that logic to a single
solution.
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found a champion in Venturi.
Venturi began by openly opposing established architectural opinion,
decrying its unwillingness to confront the confusions and complications
of current conditions. 98 He urged the profession to reflect on its
history, "guided not by habit but by a conscious sense of the past-by
precedent, thoughtfully considered."99 What he found satisfying in the
past was its lack of forced simplification; 100 this led him to conclude
that "[a] valid order accommodates the circumstantial contradictions of
a complex reality. It accommodates as well as imposes. It thereby
admits ... improvisation within the whole. It tolerates qualifications
and compromise." 101
Accomodation and toleration instead of suppression and absolutism;
that was the radical change Venturi proposed. Architecture must accept
"elements that are both good and awkward, big and little, closed and
open, continuous and articulated, round and square, structural and

Id.
98. See Arthur Drexler, Foreword to ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 8 (2d ed. 1977).
Like his buildings, Venturi's book opposes what many would consider
Establishment, or at least established, opinions. He speaks with uncommon
candor, addressing himself to actual conditions: the ambiguous and sometimes
unattractive "facts" in which architects find themselves enmeshed at each
moment, and whose confusing nature Venturi would seek to make the basis of
architectural design.
Id.
99. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 13.
I 00. See COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 17 ("Forced
simplicity results in oversimplification. . . . Where simplicity cannot work, simpleness
results. Blatant simplification means bland architecture. Less is a bore.").
101. Id. at 41; see also STANISLAUS VON Moos, VENTURI, RAUCH & SCOTT
BROWN: BUILDINGS AND DESIGNS 32 ( 1987).
[Venturis'] intention seems to be to undermine the validity of universal rules
in architecture. . . . [A]rchitectural theory had been essentially normative.
The main concern was the establishment and the polemical spread of a formal
language and of systematic rules that were supposed to guarantee "correct"
building. The Venturis, however, view stylistic "purity" with suspicion. With
them it does not seem at all to be a matter of substituting new forms of
architectural language for old ones but rather of introducing the aesthetic
principle of complexity in order to avoid the uncritical application of allegedly
universal forms and rules.
Id.
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spatial." 102 And, in accepting this, architecture must accept the
ambiguity and tension which it breeds.
Venturi found strength in this ambiguity and tension, preferring
"richness of meaning rather than clarity of meaning," believing that "[a]
valid architecture evokes many levels of meaning and combinations of
focus: its space and its elements become readable and workable in
several ways at once." 103 He urged architects to acknowledge the
"complexity and contradiction in architecture," to accept an architecture
"based on the richness and ambiguity of modern experience," to deal
with that experience whose "anomalies and uncertainties give validity to
architecture." 104

COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 23.
If the source of the both-and phenomenon is contradiction, its basis is

102.

hierarchy, which yields several levels of meanings among elements with
varying values. It can include elements that are both good and awkward, big
and little, closed and open, continuous and articulated, round and square,
structural and spatial. An architecture which includes varying levels of
meaning breeds ambiguity and tension.

Id.
Designing from the outside in, as well as from the inside out, creates necessary
tensions, which help make architecture. Since the inside is different from the
outside, the wall----the point of change----becomes an architectural event.
Architecture occurs at the meeting of interior and exterior forces of use and
space. . . . Architecture as the wall between the inside and the outside
becomes the spatial record of this resolution and its drama.
Id. at 86.
103. Id. at 16.
Architects can no longer afford to be intimidated by the puritanically moral
language of orthodox Modem architecture. I like elements which are hybrid
rather than "pure," compromising rather than "clean," distorted rather than
"straightforward," ambiguous rather than "articulated," perverse as well as
impersonal, boring as well as "interesting," conventional rather than "designed," accommodating rather than excluding, redundant rather than simple,
vestigial as well as innovating, inconsistent and equivocal rather than direct
and clear. I am for messy vitality over obvious unity. I include the non
sequitur and proclaim the duality.

Id.
I 04. Id. at 16, 41; see also Robert Venturi, Diversity, Relevance, and Representation
in Historicism, or Plus ,a Change ... plus a Plea for Pattern All Over Architecture
with a Postscript on My Mother's House, in ROBERT VENTURI & DENISE SCOTT BROWN,
A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO: SELECTED ESSAYS 1953-1984 I 08 (Peter Amell et al.
eds., 1984) [hereinafter, VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO] (where Venturi describes his
call "for an architecture that promotes richness and ambiguity over unity and clarity,
contradiction and redundancy over harmony and simplicity").
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Venturi 's architecture of complexity and contradiction is not
diffracted; it seeks unity, "the difficult unity through inclusion rather
than the easy unity through exclusion." 105 The unity of inclusion
recognizes rather than masks the ambiguities and tensions, the anomalies
and uncertainties of modern experience:
The obligation toward the whole in an architecture of complexity and
contradiction does not preclude the building which is unresolved. Poets and
playwrights acknowledge dilemmas without solutions. The validity of the
questions and vividness of meaning are what make their works art more than
philosophy. . . . A building can also be more or less incomplete in the
expression of it program and its form. 106

Venturi 's reference to literature, as well as his use of the term
expression, was not inadvertent. His buildings are as much an expression of his views as were his writings. In either medium, he is always
communicating to an audience. 107 He understands that building is "a
form of public discourse," that it serves "as a way of informing and
connecting that which is new with that which already exists." 108 This
was how architecture functioned in the past; it was this function which
Venturi brought forward to counter the absolutism and monasticism of
modern architecture. He argued for the development of an "architectural

105. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 88.
I 06. Id. at I 02.
107. See Vincent Scully, Robert Venturi's Gentle Architecture, in THE ARC!IlTECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI, supra note 97, at 8, 17.
Venturi will never make a building without a comment, without something in
it that can only be of now. It is not a sense of the zeitgeist which directs
him-----not a feeling of being limited by the present, but rather of being
liberated by it to comment as he desires.
Id. at 17.
[In the Guild House] Venturi was trying to deal with the real, and with the
compassion that only irony can handle. He is wholly an artist, and his primary
concern is to increase the aesthetic intensity of everyone's reaction to his
building. And he did: where there might have been apathy or pro Jonna
approbation, there was at least concern.
Id. at 24.
108. Neil Levine, Robert Venturi and "The Return of Historicism, " in THE
ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI, supra note 97, at 45, 65. Earlier, the author said
Venturi used "the signifying elements of representation that allow architecture to
function as part of a larger social and urban form of discourse." Id. at 56; see also
Francis Carney, The summa popologica of Robert ('call me Vegas') Venturi, RIBA J.,
May I 973, at 242.
Venturi is ... wholly in favour of symbolic content in building. What makes
the building of the orthodox modems "irresponsible", he says, is the fact that
architects are unwilling or unable to recognise the content they put into their
buildings .... [M]ost modern buildings are merely so many media for an
outworn upper middle class message, and the message and the medium are the
same thing.
Id.
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rhetoric" which would "genuinely represent his client's aspirations and
way of life," 109 which would produce buildings "rich in calculated
symbolism and iconography and [which] were meant to be read that
way_,,110
It is that ability to be read which gives buildings, including the singlefamily house, an expressive content. Venturi unearthed and revitalized
an architecture, including a residential architecture, which gave the
viewer "deliberate symbols, not abstract forms---symbols of building
types, of life styles, of American society, ...." 111 Venturi respects
America's single-family house tradition and its symbols; he uses that
tradition and those symbols to express something new. 112 Venturi sees
the single-family house as an opportunity for the novice architect to
"deal with a real user-client, . . . and therefore to deal with the
irrationalities of emotional needs and values"; he sees it as an opportunity for the experienced architect "to be able to control the whole in a way
that distills and clarifies and informs the bigger work at hand." 113
What Venturi delivers is a house expressing the client's needs and values
in a way which is clear to the reader. This, as the next section will
discuss, is architecture as expression comparable to other forms of
expression recognized in First Amendment jurisprudence.

109. Roger Jellinek, In Praise(!) of las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1972, at L23.
110. Ada L. Huxtable, In Love With Times Square, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 18,
1973, at 29, 46.
111. Paul Goldberger, Less is More-Mies van der Rohe; Less is a Bore-Robert
Venturi, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 17, 1971, at 34, 102.
112. See Paul Goldberger, Architecture: Venturi and Rauch, ARCHITECTURAL DIG.,
Jan.-Feb. 1978, at I 03.
Venturi and Rauch is a finn of architects deeply concerned with architectural
symbolism and with the use of cultural symbols as makers of architectural
fonn. There is no modem purism here. Instead, there is respect for the
traditional American shingled house, and an attempt to use that tradition as the
beginning point for something new.
Id.
113. Robert Venturi & Denise S. Brown, Some Houses of Ill-Repute, in VIEW FROM
THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note I 04, at 38; see also Paul Goldberger, The Masterpieces
They Call Home, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 12, 1995, at 41, 60 ("Whoever the client and
whatever the relationship, the house is the arena in which an architect can express his
ideas most easily. Architects who routinely design skyscrapers and museums crave the
chance to do houses if only because there is no purer testing ground for architectural
issues.").
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III.

Architecture, particularly as seen in the exterior of the single-family
house, is an expressive art, expressive of individual and cultural values,
status, and yeamings. 114 Recognizing and celebrating this expressive
content is a hallmark of Robert Venturi's architectural theory and
production. He is an artist who has opened our eyes, who has described
and produced an expressive architecture. 115 He successfully undertook
a search for meaning and symbolism, a way to reestablish architecture's ties
with human experience, a way to find and express a value system, a concern for
architecture in the context of society. . . . [A]rchitecture is much more than
real estate, shelter, or good intentions; it is the recognition of that extraordinary
mixture of the pragmatic and the spiritual that is the tangible vehicle of man's
aspirations and beliefs, the lasting indicator of his civilized achievements.

n,

Architects, like painters or poets or even law review writers, must
have something to say; otherwise, why undertake the project? 117 Every

114. See Bruce A. Rubin, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment,
28 STAN. L. REV. 179, 182 (1975); Aoki, supra note 91, at 773, 779, 784-85, 794. For
the views of non-law review writers, see the special Houses As Art issue ofN.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 12, 1995. See also WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, LOOKING AROUND: A JOURNEY
THROUGH ARCHITECTURE 187-88 (1992) [hereinafter LOOKING AROUND]
("[A]rchitecture, like painting, is an art, and hence can be appreciated on its own merits.
In the sense that 'art' refers to any skill applied to a creative activity, architecture
certainly qualifies.").
115. See Vincent Skully, Introduction to ROBERT VENTURJ, COMPLEXITY AND
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 11 (2d ed. 1977).
116. Ada L. Huxtable, The Troubled State of Modern Architecture, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, May 1980, at 22, 29; see also Robert Hughes, Doing Their Own Thing, TIME,
Jan. 8, 1979, at 52.
or architecture is the social art: one looks at a painting or sculpture, but
people live and work in buildings. It is the most expensive art of all and
therefore the slowest to change; for once clients are used to a particular look,
a standard method of construction and an conventional system of statusconferring clues, it is hard to wean any but the most adventurous away from
them. Architecture is also the most visible of all arts. Buildings shape the
environment; painting and sculpture only adorn it.
Id.
117. See Charles Jencks, Venturi et al. are Almost all Right, 4 7 ARCHITECTURAL
DESIGN no. 7-8 (1977) at 469 ("If architects have nothing important to say, if society has
no credible ideology to communicate through its buildings, then building language is
going to deteriorate even further."); see also Sigrid H. Fowler, Architecture and the Civic
Body, I J. POPULAR CULTURE 426 (1973).
Buildings-as-the-communicating-body-of-a-culture is not a new idea. . ..
Architecture is, after all, an art form as well as a convenience and as such
involves communication between artist and perceiver. It is easy to see how
words like "vocabulary" and "vernacular" might be current in architectural
trade jargon ....
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building, even the most standard of tract houses, says something; the
house, in particular, says something about the inhabitants, something
which can be read by them, by their neighbors, by passersby. 118
Venturi has enriched the content of this expression and has made it
explicit; he has revitalized the architect's vocabulary and recalled from
exile "the traditional power of building to express ideas and values as
well as spatial relationships." 119 Borrowing from literary theory and
expression, he resurrected architecture's "symbolic properties,"
reminding us that architecture conveys meaning "because people
experience buildings not only as volume and forms to be seen ... but
also intellectually, in the mmd's eye." 120 Architecture is part of our

Id.; John F. Pile, Book Review, INTERIORS, July 1967, at 24 (reviewing ROBERT
VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (Museum of Modern
Art, I 967)) ("Insofar as architecture is an art (as distinguished from a building
technology) it is concerned with expressio~xpression of its physical reality in
structure and function, and of its time and place through their effects on the attitudes of
the architect."); LOOKING AROUND, supra note 114, at 266 ("The communication of
meaning, more than beauty, distinguishes architecture frorn engineering.").
118. See Fowler, supra note 117, at 429 ("Architects [according to Venturi and his
co-authors] must contribute not just to the public's aesthetic awareness, but also to its
needs. They must communicate with instead of lecturing our society, or at least speak
to it but also listen."). See also Lance Wright, Robert Venturi and Anti-Architecture,
ARCHITECTURAL REV., Apr. I 973, at 262, 264, describing architecture as,
a social art; it is not, and never has been, the exclusive province of a race of
people called "architects." Certainly architects have a special function within
this province: to put new ideas into circulation; in some manner to "control"
and make meaningful the places where people go; and above all to convert
visual ideas into the architectural medium, giving them the degree of
abstraction and of boldness needed to make them "read" in the wide setting
of architectural space.
119. Franz Schulze, Chaos as Architecture, ART IN AM., July-Aug. 1970, at 89, 93.
As Venturi explained, architects
have traditionally used symbolism in architecture to enrich its content and to
include other dimensions, some almost literary, which make architecture a not
purely spatial medium. Symbolism expands the scope of architecture to
include meaning as well as expression, and to promote explicit communication,
denotative as well as connotative.
VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note I 04, at I 09.
120. W!TOLD RYBCZYNSK!, THE MOST BEAUTIFUL HOUSE IN THE WORLD 161
(1989). The author then developed this point:
Umberto Eco has described the different symbolic properties of architectural
objects as fulfilling either a primary or a secondary sign-function. The first
is denotative and related directly to the utilitarian function of the object; the
second catagory is connotative and carries a more complex set of meanings.
. . . [N]either catagory is fixed, and over time one or the other can change or
even disappear.
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language, a rich and expressive part.
However, unlike a painter or a poet who can create solely for his or
her own pleasure, without regard to a buying or even an observing
public, the non-hermetic architect creates designs to be built, to be used,
to fulfill a function, to transmit meaning for the inhabitants and to
others. 121 Architecture reflects values; it "is always a mirror in which,
if we look carefully, we can catch glimpses of our own aspirations and
beliefs." 122 This mirror is both large and small; we can see ourselves
in the largest of public buildings or in the most modest of houses.
Architecture's "most difficult task" is to create "places that can speak
meaningfully to their users." 123 This is what Venturi's architecture has
done; it has opened the way to "the organization of a unique whole
through conventional parts and the judicious introduction of new parts
when the old won't do," creating "meaningful contexts" which create
"new meanings." 124 His architecture expresses much about who we
are and who we want to be in a world filled with complexity and
contradiction. 125 Venturi 's architecture is expression as surely as oral

Id. at 162.
121. See id. at 4 ("All buildings have a function [and] are undertaken not to gratify
the designer but to fulfill a social purpose."); see a/so COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 11 {"There is no way to separate form from meaning; one cannot
exist without the other. There can only be different critical assessments of the major
ways through which form transmits meaning to the viewer.").
122. LOOKING AROUND, supra note 114, at xviii. The author believes that "[t]he
importance of buildings ... was not what they said about the vision of individual
architects, but how they reflected the values of the society of which they were a part."
Id. He later developed this point:
Classical architecture managed to convey meaning in a fashion that was not
only rich enough to be used in a variety of public buildings but also widely
understood and cherished. Its potency and its longevity were enhanced by its
widespread application in the modest architecture of homes and places of
work.
Id. at 267.
123. Martin Filler, Seeing the Forest for the Trees, PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE
56, 58 (Oct. 1977). See also Goldberger, supra note 113, at 56-57, quoting the architect
Robert A.M. Stem:
I think a really good architect has a sense of how spaces unfold visually, how
you get people to move through space, how people really live," Stem says.
"The house is one kind of building that is experienced day in and day out by
the same people, not like a museum you go to just a handful of times. It is
a series of extraordinarily complex specifics that an architect has to put
together and end up with something general enough to be understood by a lot
of people.
124. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 43.
125. Venturi, who believes that in finding what "we like ... we can learn much of
what we really are," says he "frankly write[s] about what I like in architecture:
complexity and contradiction." Id. at 13. He has emphasized "image-image over
process or form in asserting that architecture depends in its perception and creation on
past experience and emotional association and that these symbolic and representational
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or written speech is; "he thinks visually with forms as much as he thinks
verbally with words." 126 His buildings are meant to be seen, to be
read with intelligence; form not only follows thought, form is thought.
Venturi's career began with housing, both single-family and group.
He is sensitive not only to housing's shelter qualities but also to its
expressive content. He knows that "Americans' self-expression in and
around their homes is an important clue to their attitudes, the more so
because this form of self-expression is practiced by almost all social
groups, by young and old, rich and poor, renters and owners, urbanites
and suburbanites." 127 He knows that our houses embody sentiments
and values, expressing them to our neighbors and passersby.
Although this conclusion seems inescapable--that the exterior design
of a single-family house has an expressive content-it is a conclusion
which must be accepted if the further argument is to be made: that the

elements may often be contradictory to the form, structure and program with which they
combine in the same building." ROBERT VENTURI, ET AL., LEARNING FROM LAS
VEGAS: THE FORGOTTEN SYMBOLISM OF ARCHITECTURAL FORM 87 (Rev. ed. 1977).
That emphasis is seen in this review of a Venturi building:
Wu Hall is an inclusive essay in architectural convention. . . . What Wu Hall
does do ... is---like Eliot's poems---force us to compare inconsistent, even
irreconcilable, conventions that have been improbably drawn together within
the same constructive system. . . . All architectural construction and form ...
assumes a self-conscious sense of convention in this rhetorical world, with the
improbable comparisons heightening our sense of both the past and present and
proposing a world within which both co-exist in an uneasy but meaningful
juxtaposition.
Stephen Kieran, The Image in the Empty Frame: Wu Hall and the Art of Representation, THE ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT VENTURI, supra note 97, at 87.
126. Mead, supra note 97, at 6.
The act of seeing, of looking with intelligence, is emphasized because it seems
that architects and historians alike have tended to substitute passing familiarity
with Venturi' s architectural theory for perceptive comprehension of his
buildings. The notoriety [ofVenturi's books] has obscured the simple fact that
Venturi is, first of all, an architect ... that he thinks visually with forms as
much as he thinks verbally with words. The interpretive bias for a philological
understanding of Venturi must be balanced by a return to the expression of his
ideas in architectural forms.
Id.
127. Robert Venturi et al., The Home, in VENTURI, SCOTT BROWN & ASSOCIATES
ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 59 (1992) [hereinafter The Home]; see also WITOLD
RYBCZYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 75 (1986) ("To speak of
domesticity is to describe a set of felt emotions, not a single attribute. Domesticity has
to do with family, intimacy, and a devotion to the home, as well as with a sense of the
house as embodying-not only harboring-these sentiments.").
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expressive content is entitled to First Amendment protection. Finding
the expression is always the starting point.
That was the starting point in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim
where operators of adult bookstores challenged an ordinance which
prohibited all live entertainment including the non-obscene nude dancing
which the bookstores offered their customers. 128 The operators argued
that the prohibition violated First Amendment free expression rights.
The Supreme Court agreed.
The Court started by finding that the ordinance's prohibition barred:
a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Entertainment, as well as political
and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by
radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic
works, fall with the First Amendment guarantee .... Furthermore, ... nude
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.129

Although the municipality could zone to achieve "a satisfactory quality
of life," its zoning power was "not infinite and unchallengeable; it 'must
be exercised within constitutional limits. "' 130
Those limits make every exercise of zoning power "subject to judicial
review" under a standard "determined by the nature of the right
assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being
exercised or the specific limitations imposed." 131 Although zoning of
property interests generally receives a rational relationship review, "when
a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly
drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest."132 Because the ordinance at issue in Schad "significantly" limited
"communicative activity," the Court scrutinized both "the interests
advanced ... to justify this limitation on protected expression and the
means chosen to further those interests." 133
The Court concluded that the municipality had "not adequately
justified its substantial restriction of protected activity." 134 Nor was

128. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62-65 (1981).
I 29. Id. at 65-66. Nude dancing continues to receive First Amendment protection,
although it is grudgingly given by some members of the Court. See Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
I 30. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 71.
134. Id. at 72. See also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2377
(I 995), where, in a case involving government regulation of commercial speech
(lawyers' targeted direct mail solicitations), the Court said,
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the ordinance "narrowly drawn to respond to what might be distinctive
problems arising from certain types of live entertainment." 135 The
municipality failed to establish "that its interests could not be met by
restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression." 136
Justice Blackmun, although joining the Court's opinion, wrote to
"emphasize that the presumption of validity that traditionally attends a
local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any,
weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression
protected under the First Amendment." 137 He concluded "that in
attempting to accommodate a locality's concern to protect the character
of its community life, the Court must remain attentive ... in particular
to the protection [First Amendment guarantees] afford to minorities
against the 'standardization of ideas ... by ... dominate political or
community groups. "' 138
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, troubled because the record
left "so many relevant questions unanswered." 139 He said the Court
was "left to speculate" why the municipality acted against the bookstores
and why the ordinance drew a line between forms of entertainment. 140

the State must demonstrate that the challenged regulation "advances the
Government's interest 'in a direct and material way."' . . . That burden, we
have explained, "'is not satisfied by mere speculation and conjecture; rather,
a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech
must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree."'
135. Schad, 452 U.S. at 74.
136. Id. Compare Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), where Indiana
used a public indecency statute to require otherwise nude dancers in a private adult
entertainment establishment to wear pasties and G-strings. However, less narrowly
applied public indecency statutes may violate the First Amendment. See Triplett Grille,
Inc. v. Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994).
137. Schad, 452 U.S. at 77. For a reviewing court to perform its function, he said,
"the zoning authority must be prepared to articulate, and support, a reasoned and
significant basis for its decision." Id. Justices Powell and Stewart, in their concurrence,
noted that the municipality had "failed altogether to justify its broad restriction of
protected expression." Id. at 79.
138. Id. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
I, 4-5 (1949)).
139. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 83-84. Justice Stevens explained his discomfort with the state of the
record:
While a municipality need not persuade a federal court that its zoning
decisions are correct as a matter of policy, when First Amendment interests are
implicated it must at least be able to demonstrate that a uniform policy in fact
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He concurred in the Court's judgment because "neither the text of the
zoning ordinance nor the evidence in the record" demonstrated that the
municipality "applied narrowly drawn content-neutral standards" to the
bookstores' activity. 141
The Court accepted that activity-non-obscene live nude dancing--as
a form of individual expression entitled to First Amendment protection.
The Court did not question whether the dancing was intended to
communicate a specific message. What the following section will argue
is that residential architecture, the exterior design of a single-family
house, does send a particularized message to neighbors and passersby,
a message that can be read much as poetry or prose can. As such, it,
more so than non-obscene live nude dancing, is entitled to protection
under the First Amendment.

IV.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet said that architecture is
speech, many students of the subject believe that conclusion is inevitable.142 John Costonis has reached that conclusion, adding that "[f]or
many, architecture and other environmental features communicate ideas

exists and is applied in a content-neutral fashion. Presumably, municipalities
may regulate expressive activity--even protected activity--pursuant to
narrowly drawn content-neutral standards; however, they may not regulate
protected activity when the only standard provided is the unbridled discretion
of a municipal official.
Id. at 84.
141. Id. at 84.
142. See Stephen F. Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of
Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. I, 22 (1977); Rubin, supra note 114, at 18 I,
187-88; Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can't Build That Here: The Constitutionality of
Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1024 (1990).
However, not all students agree. See Shawn G. Rice, Comment, Zoning Law:
Architectural Appearance Ordinances and the First Amendment, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 439
(1993); Lori E. Fields, Note, Aesthetic Regulation and the First Amendment, 3 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURCES L. 237 (1984).
Most recently, in a case involving state regulation of a parade, a unanimous Court
made the following characterization:
The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners
and songs, however, for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words
as mediums of expression. . . . As some of these examples show, a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,
which if confined to expressions conveying a "particularized message," ...
would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollack,
music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345
(1995).
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more effectively than does language," 143 For example, architecture
serves as a vehicle for those who work in literature; in tum, literature
serves as a vehicle for those who work in architecture. 144 Even the
often mundane architecture of the single-family house is an expression
more akin to direct oral or written speech than to indirect conduct1 45 :
The making of a house is, in a true sense, the laying bare of character. We all
reveal our needs and our wants in the process; it is not for nothing that
architects who specialize in houses often joke that they feel more like
psychiatrists. They not only know what their clients desire ... they know how
these people react to one another, how they make decisions, how they function
under pressure, what they value most and what they are willing to sacrifice. 146

143. COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 94. See also Goldberger, Masterpieces, supra
note I 13, at 46, describing an architect's client who
might well be the Platonic version of the architecture-believing patron. ·A
longtime lover of great buildings, she set out from the beginning to produce
a house that would not only shelter her family but would communicate to them
and to her friends her enthusiasms and even, she hoped, in some way advance
the art of architecture.
144. See Angeline Goreau, The Age ofExtravagance, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., May
22, I 994, at 13 (book review).
(Edith Wharton] regarded each house she lived in-and its garden-as a
canvas for composition, to be approached as seriously as she did her novels.
In Wharton's later, more sophisticated work, architecture serves as a
language, one that accrues substantial consequence in the lives of characters
whose world dictates that so much must remain unspoken.
Id.; see also Adam Gopnik, The Ghost of the Glass House, NEW YORKER, May 9, 1994,
at 54, 66 (discussing the Maison de Verre (the Glass House) ("one of the few modern
buildings to value function and fantasy equally, without succumbing to the lure of
historical pastiche---'the one isolated poetic interpretation of the pure glass and steel
aesthetic,' .... "). The author developed this theme: "The Glass House is like a poem,
and, like any poem, it presents a universe of possible readings to the contemplative mind
while remaining fixed, structured, and essentially inalterable---change a word and you've
ruined the effect." Id. at 69.
145. See Rubin, supra note 114, at 185.
Like other forms of expression, architecture can serve to express the individual
personality. An architect---0r the builder of a house working through an
architect--uses brick as a painter uses canvas or a writer uses words to express
his notions of beauty and comfort, as well as many of his social values.
Moreover, a house compatible with one's own tastes can foster creativity,
peace of mind, and other mental states important to individual happiness and
well-being. Accordingly, determination of at least the aesthetic features of
residential architecture warrants constitutional protection like that afforded
other forms of self-expression.
Id.

146. Paul Goldberger, Raise High the Roof Beams, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Oct.
6, 1985, at I, 36; see also TRACY KIDDER, HOUSE I 3 (Avon Books ed. I 986)(describing
a couple who "had imagined in some detail a house that would suit them functionally.
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If, as this Article argues, the exterior design of a single-family house
is a statement about the inhabitants' notions of beauty and comfort and
values, then actions such as the City of Ladue's rejection of the
Stoyanoffs' unusual design raise significant First Amendment questions,
questions similar to those raised by the City of Ladue's rejection of Ms.
Gilleo's window sign. As Gilleo and Schad illustrate, a municipality's
zoning actions can raise First Amendment questions; this is certainly true
when the municipality uses aesthetic criteria to evaluate the exterior
design of a single-family house.
In using aesthetic criteria to reject a housing design, the municipality
rejects the proponents, the people who want to build and live in the
house. The municipality's rejection is a rejection of the proponents'
character, their needs and wants, their views of what a house should be.
The municipality says such people and such views are not only
unwelcome but are a threat to others. The single-family house "is an
extension of one's own physical being," an expression of personal
identity and social aspiration. 147 It is a way homeowners "communicate with others about themselves," about their "social status, social
aspirations, personal identity, individual freedom." 148 To have the
content of that communication rejected as grotesque is to suffer a
significant rejection indeed.
It is both the direct and personal nature of the homeowner's expression which makes it's speech more akin to oral and written speech than
to conduct-conveyed expression such as non-obscene live nude dancing.
Architecture contains content which is intended to be read like prose or
poetry. One of Robert Venturi's breakthroughs was the explicit
application of literary critical theory to both the analysis and construction

. . . But they were stuck on the question, among others, of what style of house theirs
should be. How should it look to their new neighbors, to their mends, and to people
passing by ... ").
147. The Home, supra note 127, at 58.
148. Id. See also Herbert Muschamp, Ten Little Houses and How They Grew, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. I 6, I 994, at H40, reviewing a show of residential architecture:
Clearly, this is a highly polemical show.... At heart, it is a response to the
conservative crusade for family values and to the "neo-traditional" housing ...
which embody that crusade in architectural form. The IO projects add up to
a protest against attempts to impose rigid social norms on a diverse society.
If there's any logic to the idea that private houses can perform this political
function, it goes something like this: Families live in houses. Architects
design them. Their designs reflect prevailing social attitudes. As those
attitudes change, the designs change. And perhaps designers can accelerate
social change by representing progressive attitudes in built form.
The author said, "[t]here are sound historical reasons for proceeding with this logic."
Id.
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of architecture. 149 This is seen in his residential architecture: "At their
best, [Venturi's houses] merge a kind of childlike delight with an adult's
ironic sensibility, bringing to architecture an attitude not altogether
different from that which Lewis Carroll brought to literature." 150
Venturi's message, in words and construction, has been "in many ways
sensible enough: the ambiguities and complexities which certain critics
. . . find essential to literary value, are equally valid for architecture. "1 s1

For Venturi, writing and building are inextricably linked; each is a
medium of expression, and the content of one reinforces the content of
the other: "Writing was important to us as younger architects before we
had the opportunity to express ideas through building. . . . Writing, for
us, is part of a cycle of development that results in both theory and
building: we look, analyze, synthesize through writing, synthesize
through design, then look again." 152 Or, as Venturi noted, "[w]hen my
ideas about building exceed my opportunities to build, I get the ideas out
in words rather than bricks and mortar." 153 Venturi believes that
readers appreciate architecture for its associational quality rather than for
any abstract aesthetic resonance; he thus works to make his buildings
"readable and familiar again for its users as well as for a larger
public." 154 He was the first to coherently and persuasively advocate
"that architecture, like language, has semiological components that can
be effectively utilised to send signals to those experiencing it," that

149. See Vincent Scully, Preface to ROBERT VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 13 (2d ed. 1977) ("[T.S.J Eliot discusses analysis and
comparison as tools of literary criticism. These critical methods are valid for
architecture too: architecture is open to analysis like any other aspect of experience, and
is made more vivid by comparisons."); see also Hughes, supra note 116, at 52 ("Apart
ftom age, the main thing [Post-modern architects] have in common is a fascination with
architecture as language. When tradition ... appears in their work, it is quoted rather
than adhered to. There is no common style.").
150. Paul Goldberger, Robert Venturi-In Love With the Art of Building, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1982, at H27, H28.
15!. Joseph Rykwert, Book Review, DOMUS, Aug. 1967, at 23 (reviewing ROBERT
VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (1966)).
152. Denise s. Brown, Introduction to A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO: SELECTED
ESSAYS 1953-1984 9 (Peter Arnell et al. eds., 1984).
153. Robert Venturi, The RIBA Annual Discourse, in VIEW FROM THE
CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note l 04, at l 04.
154. VON Moos, supra note 101, at 30.
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architecture "is no longer considered to be like a text, but has become
the text itself." 155
Venturi's critical literary interests led him, as an architect, to reject
any absolutist approach to architectural problem solving. 156 Quite the
contrary. Venturi concluded that architecture needed to recognize and,
occasionally, celebrate the problems; he argued for the acceptance of
designs which recognized architecture's complexities and contradictions.
Designs which excluded these complexities and contradictions risked
"separating architecture from the experience of life and the needs of
157
society."
The architect need not hide from insoluble problems but
can openly express them; "in an inclusive rather than an exclusive kind
of architecture there is room for the fragment, for contradiction, for
improvisation, and for the tensions these produce." 158
Yet, an acceptance of architectural complexity and contradiction does
not mean that the resulting building must be discordant or even difficult
to decipher. Venturi's architecture speaks in an easily understandable
way. 159 He knows that the single-family house serves as a "means of
self-expression" for the residents; 160 his housing designs can be read
easily, coherently, logically and yet can be regarded, eventually, as
161
masterworks.
Venturi can build as well as write, can express in a

155. James Steele, Living the Legend in Philadelphia, in VENTURI, SCOTT BROWN
& ASSOCIATES ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 9 (1992).
156. See VON Moos, supra note 101, at 11 ("From the literary aesthetics of
complexity and contradiction that interested Venturi, new priorities did indeed emerge.
The question was not so much how to ·solve' ... complicated problems ... with the
simplest means possible. . . . Rather, the question was how to design while allowing for
the existence of such problems.").
157. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 17.
158. Id.
159. See Fowler, supra note 117, at 429 ("Apparently, the message [Venturi] would
like to see in architectural forms is a statement not about the physical forces acting on
the structure or the constructional problems heroically surmounted, but something easily
understandable about the function the building has in the local milieu."); see also Filler,
supra note 123, at 57.
Venturi and Rauch have carried off bravura effects in the past with an
apparent ease that eludes even the best of their would-be imitators. . . . These
architects have an undeniable gift for choosing images whose associations
summon up resonant responses, and Venturi & Rauch's success in doing so
has been tied directly to their very informed selection of those images.
Id.

160. The Home, supra note 127, at 58.
161. See Frederic Schwartz, Foreword, MOTHER'S HOUSE: THE EVOLUTION OF
VANNA VENTURJ'S HOUSE IN CHESTNUT HILL 11 (Frederic Schwartz ed. 1992),
discussing the house Venturi built for his mother: "The [house is] ... a small domestic
masterpiece that challenged the definition of modem architecture and redefined the
conception of what a house should look like. Its historical references, use of symbolism,
color, and ornament were profound and provocative during a period of almost universal
acceptance of orthodox modem design." See also Thomas Beeby, Association and
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house meanings as clear as if written on the walls. 162 His houses as
text, are "a clear and cogent translation of the Venturi principles into
actual building." 163 And it is a text, an expression, for the inhabitants
who, after all, must commission or accept the architect's work; this is
seen in the following reading of a weekend house designed by Venturi:
As a weekend house for a New York couple, this little building i&--like all of
Venturi & Rauch 's house&--an act of art patronage, however modest and
workable it may be. It embodies a statement, by the owners as well as the
architects, about the traditions of home in America. It says all that need be said
about the desire for convenience with a bit of grandiloquence, about bucolic
ideas vs. urbanity, about formal organization with vernacular liberties. It puts
all our domestic memories into one little box. 164

Dissociation: The Trubeck and Wislocki Houses, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF ROBERT
VENTURI 68, 81 (Christopher Mead ed., 1989), discussing another Venturi designed
house: "The exterior hierarchy of window and door types allows one to read the
Wislocki House simply, without clues other than size and position. The entire building
can be interpreted as a coherent organization of pragmatic concerns and the logical
expression of elements."
162. See Complexities and Contradictions, PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, May 1965,
at 168.
Architects often explain verbally what they wish their work to transmit on
an intuitive level. In many cases, they claim a meaning for their architecture
that is not present in the finished building; in other cases, their words are as
dull as their buildings. But in [Venturi's mother's] house, without the
architect's words and on the level simply of experience, one can feel the
polarities and tensions of the architecture.
Id. See also COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 118, where Venturi
discusses the same house:
(The house] recognizes complexities and contradictions: it is both complex
and simple, open and closed, big and little; some of its elements are good on
one level and bad on another; its order accomodates the generic elements of
the house in general, and the circumstantial elements of a house in particular.
It achieves the difficult unity of a medium number of diverse parts rather than
the easy unity of few or many motival parts.
163. Paul Goldberger, Tract House, Celebrated, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sept. 14, 1975,
at 68; see also Hughes, supra note 116, at 58 ("Nothing in this [Venturi designed
vacation house] could be called revivalist; everything is quotation and proposition,
exaggerated detail held in parantheses. Venturi seems to be expressing the same sort of
relationship to the past that theorizing mannerist architects ... had with Michaelangelo's
more heroic prototypes.").
164. John M. Dixon, Country Manners, PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE Oct. I 977, at
64, 66.
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V.

To accept the exterior design of a single-family house as a text entitled
to First Amendment protection runs smack into a wall; certainly the
Stoyanoffs ran into it in Ladue, Missouri when they sought to build an
unusual looking single-family residence. A municipality such as Ladue
may not only enact zoning laws, but may enforce them based on its
aesthetic evaluation of the exterior design of a proposed building.
It was not always so. Until 1954, aesthetic criteria were, at most,
accepted only as ancillary considerations in zoning decisions. The
prevailing view was that government should not regulate aesthetics
because it could neither adequately define aesthetic standards nor ensure
evenhanded application of them. 165 Even when a municipality apparently did regulate for aesthetic reasons, the courts would perform
analytical contortions to apply the seemingly less troublesome standards
of health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
An example is Gorieb v. Fox. 166 The landowner wanted to build a
store on the street line in a residential area where the zoning ordinance
required a set-back from the street line. The landowner challenged the
set-back ordinance on constitutional grounds.
The year before, the Court had decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. where a landowner had challenged the constitutionality of a
municipality's comprehensive zoning ordinance. 167 The Euclid Court
noted that urban life was no longer simple, that "with the great increase
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and
constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require,
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands in urban communities." 168 The question in Euclid involved "the
validity of what is really the crux of the more recent zoning legislation,
namely, the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses,
are excluded." 169
The Court concluded that such exclusions were factually well-founded,
noting that
reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking consideration, concur in the
view that the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings will

I 65.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 20.
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
Id. at 386-87.
Id. at 390.
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make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity
of the development in each section; that it will increase the safety and security
of home life; greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by
reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; decrease
noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders;
preserve a more favorable environment in which to rear children, etc.' 70

Such reasons were "sufficiently cogent" to preclude the Court from
saying "as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare." 171
The Gorieb Court characterized Euclid as validating "comprehensive
zoning laws and ordinances, prescribing, among other things, the height
of buildings ... and the extent of the area to be left open for light and
air and in aid of fire protection, etc." 172 Echoing Euclid, Gorieb concerned with "the vast changes in the extent and complexity of the
problems of modem city life" - said the municipality was better
qualified to deal with these conditions and could do so undisturbed "by
the courts unless [its conclusions are] clearly arbitrary and unreasonable."173 The conclusions reached by the municipality in Gorieb were
not arbitrary and unreasonable; the members of the city council
concluded "that front yards afford room for lawns and trees, keep the
dwellings farther from the dust, noise and fumes of the street, add to the
attractiveness and comfort of a residential district, create a better home
environment, and ... reduce the fire hazard." 174 These conclusions
were sufficient to satisfy the Euclid standard that the ordinance have a
rational relation to the public safety, health, moral, or general welfare.
Although Euclid spoke in terms of preserving a favorable environment,
and Gorieb spoke in terms of preserving an area's attractiveness and
comfort, those words did not cause a flood of aesthetic-based zoning
ordinances; as noted, until 1954, aesthetics were an ancillary--not a
primary-basis for zoning regulation. And, when the floodgates were
opened, it seemed almost by accident. The opening came in Berman v.

I 70.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Gorieb, 274 U.S. at 608 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 609.
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Parker where landowners raised a Fifth Amendment challenge to
congressional urban renewal legislation for the District of Columbia. 175
A unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, rejected the
challenge. In doing so, the Court clearly signaled its unwillingness to
be drawn into a review of aesthetic-based police power actions, actions
which are "the product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of govemment." 176 Those legislative determinations are
"well-nigh conclusive"; the judiciary's scope of review "is an extremely
narrow one" 177 :
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It
is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled. . . . If those who govern ... decide that the Nation's
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way. 178

The Court would not "oversee" such decisions; they rested "in the
discretion of the legislative branch." 179
Although it spoke in terms similar to Euclid and Gorieb, Berman was
interpreted as marking "a startling break with the past;" 180 the decision
initiated a flood of legislative and judicial activity "embracing the
Berman attitude that legislating soley for beauty or aesthetics is fully
within the purview of the police power." 181 For the courts especially,
Berman became talismanic; they "have used the discretion that Berman

175.
176.
I 77.
178.
179.
180.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (I 954).
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
Id. at 35-36.
Scott Schrader, Book Note, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (1991) (reviewing

JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS:
CHANGE).

LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

181. James C. Smith, Review Essay: Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose
is a Rose is a Rose, 78 CAL. L. REV. 787, 790 (1990); see also Schrader, supra note
I 80, at 1790.
[Berman] was widely understood to signal the Court's willingness to allow
government efforts to beautify communities; for the law of aesthetics, it
marked a startling break with the past. . . . Lower courts completely reversed
their attitudes toward aesthetic initiatives, and legislatures responded with an
outpouring of statutes and statutorily created administrative agencies .... The
judiciary, taking Berman as a high court harbinger of a new direction for this
area of the law, seemed amenable to almost any such program, and began to
function as little more than a rubber-stamp reviewer of these efforts.
Id.
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affords . . . as a basis for upholding almost any aesthetic regulation."182
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to stem this flood in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas but declined to do so. 183 Unlike Berman,
which involved a Fifth Amendment challenge to congressional legislation, Belle Terre involved, in part, a First Amendment challenge to
municipal legislation. A municipal ordinance "restricted land use to onefamily dwellings" and defined family to include "[a] number of persons
not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage .... " 184
Six students living together in a leased house challenged the ordinance
as violating their associational and other constitutional rights.
As he did in Berman, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court. He
summarily rejected the students' substantive constitutional claims,
finding that the ordinance "involves no 'fundamental right' guaranteed
by the Constitution" such as the rights of association and privacy. 185
He then explicitly extended Berman to validate the municipality's
ordinance:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman . . . . The police power
is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 186

182. Williams, supra note 142, at 2; see also Smith, supra note 181, at 790.
In the decades since Berman, the modem view validating aesthetic regulation
has become firmly entrenched. . . . The new rule has served as the catalyst
and prime legal prop for a wide variety of programs, ranging from historic
preservation and the protection of scenic vistas to public architectural and
landscaping controls. Most courts have extended their full blessing to aesthetic
regulation, according it coequal status with the more traditional police power
objectives. A few modern courts have sought a middle ground, characterizing
aesthetics as a proper, but less weighty, legislative end than health and safety
concerns, and therefore meriting less judicial deference.
Id.

183.
184.
l 85.
186.
concept

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974).
Id. at 2.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 9. Earlier, he wrote that in Berman, the Court "refused to limit the
of public welfare that may be enhanced by zoning regulations." Id. at 5.

325

As the Stoyanoffs discovered, decisions such as Berman and Belle
Terre have encouraged the enactment of ordinances and the establishment of review boards which aesthetically regulate the exterior design
of new and existing structures, including the single-family house. 187
And, as the Stoyanoffs also discovered, decisions such as Berman and
Belle Terre have validated a judicial laissez-faire attitude toward such
ordinances, perhaps much to the judiciary's relief. 188
But this abdication has a price, a steep and unacceptable one if the
exterior design of the single-family house is accepted as expressing, as
clearly as words, who and what the occupants are or wish to be, both
individually and as members of a community. 189 The law, through its
judges and its judgments, affects this expression and should protect it,
absent a sufficiently substantial showing by the government under
narrow, clearly defined standards. 190

187. See Regan, supra note 142, at 1015-16. The extent of the flood can be seen
in James P. Karp, The Evolving Meaning of Aesthetics in Land-Use Regulation, 15
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 307, 313-14 n.35 (1990).
188. See COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 20. And that judicial relief may be, in part,
relief at being insulated from having to wrestle with the slippery problem of aesthetic
definition; see also Williams, supra note 142, at 18-19.
The problem of articulating aesthetic standards represents perhaps the extreme
case of polycentricity. The number of potential designs is infinite; the choice
as to any single factor, say materials, has an impact on all other factors; and
one cannot identify any non-aesthetic features that will even begin to
consistently justify the application of any aesthetic concept. At least in other
instances of polycentricity one can usually say that certain characteristics will
invariably be assets. In attempting to articulate aesthetic standards, however,
one cannot say even that much, for the use of stone, or rectilinearity, or
inclusion of windows, or any other nonaesthetic feature, is not invariably a
Hplus."

Id.
189. As Witold Rybczynski has noted, architecture, unlike other arts, "exists not
solely as a vehicle for the skill or expression of the architect but as an object with a
function." R YBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at I 88. The architect is occupied with "the
fulfillment of mundane uses ... to an extent unknown to sculptors or painters." Id.
In the sense that design and construction involve many people, architecture is
a collective pursuit. But buildings are also the product of society as a
whole--of legislation, of wealth, of technology, of custom, and, above all, of
cultural traditions. That is why buildings are so precious: they tell us who
and what we are--or wish to be-----not only as individuals but as a community.
Id. at I91.
190. See Fitzgerald, supra note 90, at 2051-52.
To acknowledge the creative quality of law is to recognize its kinship to
other endeavors traditionally called "art." Inasmuch as it creates visual
realities within the confines of the canvas, art, too, is a builder of worlds. Yet,
while both art and law exhibit a capacity for creativity, they do so in
dramatically different ways. A work of art is, at one level, an overt expression
of the artist's will to create: A central purpose of the artistic endeavor is to
bring into being an object that has not existed in concrete form before the
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What has happened in single-family housing is what we would never
permit to happen in other First Amendment activities. There has been
a homogenization of expression, a "predisposition toward accepted
design standards," and "a built-in prejudice that insulates against a
confrontation with more profound and disturbing questions." 191 Cities
and villages, townships and boroughs, have acquired an almost
unreviewable authority to impose aesthetic standards on single-family
housing----.<;tandards which avoid "the distractions of sensory or
perceptual stimulation" and which create "a condition of conformity that
makes it impossible to differentiate one locale from another." 192
What the Stoyanoffs experienced was a municipality's application of
an idea that, architecturally, "there is one dominant and correct canon of
taste in our culture and that any [design] where this canon has not been
followed is deviant and inferior." 193 Architecture is the only art where
this idea is legislatively enacted and judicially accepted; "in most fields
and media other than those of architecture, the hetereogenous quality and
ethnic diversity of American culture is accepted and is considered one
of the strengths of our culture." 194 The result is a distrust of architectural "variety and richness," a preference for "bureaucracy and standardization."195 But municipalities cannot standardize the sense of comfort
and well-being that individuals find for themselves in their houses and
which they express to their neighbors. 196 Whatever the reason for the

creative act. Law's creative quality is far less conspicuous.... Nevertheless,
judicial allocation of rights and responsibilities undeniably shapes legal
relationships among parties, patterning not only their own worlds, but also the
larger worlds that they inhabit.
Id.

191. James Wines, The Case for the Big Duck, ARCHITECTURAL FORUM Apr. 1972,
at 60.
I 92. Id.
193. Robert Venturi, A Definition of Architecture as Shelter with Decoration on It,
and Another Plea for a Symbolism of the Ordinary in Architecture, in VIEW FROM THE
CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note l04, at 66.
194. Id.
195. Safdie, supra note 97, at 64.
196. See The Home, supra note 127, at 231-32.
Most people ... recognize comfort when they experience it. This recognition
involves a combination of sensations . . . and not only physical, but also
emotional as well as intellectual, which makes comfort difficult to explain and
impossible to measure. But that does not make it any less real. ... Domestic
well-being ... is, as it always has been, the business of the family and the
individual. We must rediscover for ourselves the mystery of comfort, for
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design they selected, the Stoyanoffs certainly did not do so to be
discomforted; that house was, after all, where they wanted to live.
The Missouri court's rejection of the Stoyanoffs' design-because it
was considered unsuitable to the neighborhood's character and adverse
to the general welfare----was based on decisions from Wisconsin and
Ohio. Like the Stoyanoffs, the landowner in the Wisconsin case, State
ex rel. Save/and Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, complied with all
residential zoning requirements except for obtaining a building board's
approval of the exterior design. 197 Although the opinion does not
describe the proposed design or the design of surrounding houses, the
court characterized the municipality as "a highly desirable residential
village, almost entirely built up of single family residences." 198
Apparently the Building Board found that the exterior design of the
proposed residence was "so at variance with ... the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the structures ... in the immediate
neighborhood ... 'as to cause a substantial depreciation in the property
values of said neighborhood. "' 199
The trial court had invalidated the ordinance, in
because it was
"grounded largely upon aesthetic considerations."20 In reversing, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that where previous cases had
established a general rule that "the zoning power may not be exercised
for purely aesthetic considerations," Berman had rendered "it extremely
doubtful that such prior rule is any longer the law."201 Acknowledging
that Berman was a Fifth Amendment case, not a Fourteenth Amendment
case, the court considered "such distinction to be immaterial in
considering the scope of the police power and its exercise to promote the
general welfare."202 The court concluded that the ordinance "constitutes a valid exercise of the police power ... and its provisions are not
so indefinite or ambiguous as to subject applicants for building permits
to the uncontrolled arbitrary discretion or caprice of the Building
Board. "203
The Ohio case relied on in Stoyanoff was Reid v. Architectural Board
of Review of Cleveland Heights. 204 Ms. Reid submitted plans to build

rart

without it, our dwellings will indeed be machines instead of homes.
Id.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
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69 N.W.2d 217,219 (Wis. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
at 219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 222.

at 223.
at 224.
192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
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a house on North Park Boulevard in Cleveland Heights, a suburb
"organized to provide suitable and comfortable home surroundings for
residents employed in Cleveland"; Cleveland Heights "is a well-regulated
and carefully groomed community, primarily residential in character."205 The buildings on North Park Boulevard "are, in the main,
dignified, stately and conventional structures, two and one-half stories
high_,,206
Ms. Reid's proposed house was none of that. It was "a flat-roofed
complex of twenty modules, each of which is ten feet high, twelve feet
square ... arranged in a loosely formed 'U'."207 The house walls
were mostly glass, opening onto a garden; the rest were cement panels.
The house, the garage, and "their associated garden walls, trellises and
courts, form a series of interior and exterior spaces, all under a canopy
of trees and baffled from the street by a garden wall."208 That wall
blocked a view of the house from the street. 209
Ms. Reid submitted this design to the review board which disapproved
"this project for the reason that it does not maintain the high character
of community development in that it does not conform to the character
of the houses in the area."210 The board conceded "that this structure
would be a very interesting home placed in a different environment."211 But, "placed on North Park Boulevard, it would not only be
out of keeping with and a radical departure from the structures now
standing but would be most detrimental to the further development of
the area . . .. " 212 In addition, the design was "of such a radical
concept that any design not conforming to the general character of the
neighborhood would have to be thereafter approved ...." 213
Wieland, Reid, and Stoyanoff are representative of post-Berman
aesthetic-based cases and are representative of their dangers. Such cases
assume that there is an aesthetic certainty or, at least, an aesthetic

205. Id. at 76.
206. Id. at 77.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. As the court described it, "it is just a high wall with no indication of what is
behind it. Not only does the house fail to conform in any manner with the other
buildings but presents no identification that it is a structure for people to live in." Id.
210. Id. at 75 (quoting the order of the Architectual Board).
211. Id. at 77.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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consensus when it comes to the exterior design of single-family houses.
Such cases allow municipalities to express that certainty and enforce that
consensus without fear of judicial oversight or override. Such cases do
not allow for an individuality of expression such as that offered by Ms.
Reid or the Stoyanoffs. 214 Such cases deny the value of multiplicity,
the stimulus of the different, the existence of architectural complexity
and contradiction which Robert Venturi has described and celebrated.21s
Venturi's work calls "for an environment worthy of the inherent
eccentricities, and all the disparity of facts and values which constitute
a democratic society"; architecture, particularly in the single-family
home, should "be the expression of the pluralistic value systems of a
democratically inspired vision of life with its respect for the uniqueness
of each individual."216 This diversity is fertile; sameness is sterile. 217
An architecture which accepts complexity and contradiction
"accomodates the intimations of local context over the dogma of
universality," "provides pragmatic solutions to real problems rather than
easy obedience to ideal forms," "solves problems, but expresses them
too."21s
There are courts which, while not embracing Venturi's philosophy,
have refused to passively accept municipal efforts at aesthetic homogenization. An early example is Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh. 219 The
Hankins wanted to build a one-family "modem two-story dwelling with

214. See Denise S. Brown, Learning the Wrong Lessons From the Beaux-Arts, in
A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note 104, at 68.
[W]here aesthetic certainty exists in the profession, for example on design
review boards, it supports a deadening architectural mediocrity. . . . If we are
looking for aesthetic unity, perhaps we should try to discover our own shared
aesthetic values; but there is probably no possibility of a broad-based aesthetic
consensus for us today. Perhaps we should not seek it, but rather try to enjoy
our diversity.

Id.
215. However, at least at the outset, very few joined Venturi in that celebration.
See VINCENT SCULLY, AMERlCAN ARCHITECTLRE AND URBANISM 229 (1969) ("The
principles of compromise and multiplicity suggested [in COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION] have never been popular in America, despite the pluralism of the American
condition. It is undoubtedly because of that very heterogeneity that Americans have so
often preferred 'unifying' homogenized solutions.").
216. Naomi Miller, Book Review, JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTURAL
HISTORJANS 319, 3 I 9 (Dec. I 967) (reviewing ROBERT VENTURJ, COMPLEXITY AND
CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE ( 1966)).
217. See Nancy Love, The Deflatable Fair, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE 140 (Apr.
1969) describing Venturi's belief "that the simplifying and excluding principles of the
modem movement in architecture have produce sterility and that this approach to order
hasn't worked."
218. Venturi, supra note 104, at 108.
219. 150 A.2d 63 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).

330

[VOL. 33: 291, 1996]

Constitutional Architecture
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

a partial flat roof.'mo They were denied a building permit because the
municipality said their design did not conform to the existing houses.
The New Jersey court found this denial "clearly and palpably unreasonable in the light of the actual physical development of the municipality"
which had spawned a variety of housing styles. 221 The municipality's
denial of the Hankins' permit was "an arbitrary denial ... of a
legitimate use of their property without any colorable vestige of social
justification in terms of the general welfare or any other facet of the
police power. " 222
Twenty years later, in Morristown Road Associates v. Borough of
Bernardsville, the New Jersey court had occasion to consider, for the
first time, whether the standards in a design review ordinance were "so
broad and vague as to be incapable of being objectively applied, thereby
permitting arbitrary action[s]."223 The ordinance--which sought to
enhance the municipality's desirability, preserve property values, and
promote general welfare---required designs which were "harmonious
with the character of existing development," which avoided a "displeasing monotony of design," and which were not inconsistent "with
established architectural character in any neighborhood."224
As a starting point, the court said any zoning ordinance "must be clear
and capable of being understood and complied with by the property
owner."225 This was "particularly applicable" to architectural design
ordinances "[b]ecause of the subjective elements which can be involved"
and because of the enforcement process: "As design controls are
enforced by administrative agencies, the prerequisite of definitiveness
will only be met when the standards sufficiently confine the process of

220.
221.

Id. at 64.

As the court described it,
[t]his is an extremely small community in area. Half the old-style houses
are already partly out of their original architectural design because of the
addition of flat-roofed extensions. There are in existence almost as many
structures (of all kinds) fully out of character with the architectural restrictions
for dwellings set forth in the ordinance as those which comply with them.
Whatever new homes have been erected in the municipality in recent years
have been of modern style. These considerations are particularly cogent in the
relatively immediate vicinity of [the Hankins'] property.
Id. at 66.
222. Id.
223. 394 A.2d 157, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
224. Id. at I 62-63.
225. Id. at 161.
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administrative decision and provide a court with an understandable
criterion for review."226 After reviewing cases---including Wieland,
Reid, and Stoyanoff-which had considered whether "look-alike
standards have been considered adequate to support design review
ordinances," the court concluded that the ordinance under review did not
contain narrowly and clearly defined standards. 227 The ordinance thus
offered "no workable guidelines to one seeking approval of plans" and
no workable guidelines by which a reviewing court could determine
"when a decision has been arbitrary or capricious."228
Although the aesthetic guidelines were not workable, the municipality
in Bernardsville at least attempted to establish some; the municipality in
De Sena v. Village of Hempstead 229 did not even do that. The
landowner in De Sena wanted to build a twenty- foot wide house on his
property, a design which the municipality's board of zoning appeals
described as "an aesthetic abomination," a design which was neither
"desirable" nor "functional," a design "with a bowling alley appearance"
which would depress property values and adversely affect the area's
aesthetic character. 230
The New York Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that some
land-use regulation could be based on aesthetic considerations, cautioned
that in such cases "the public interest in regulation is not necessarily as
strong as in those cases involving threats to the public safety, and care
must be taken lest the State 'trespass through aesthetics on the human
personality. "'231 In De Sena, the zoning board acted without "specific
authorization which provides sufficient guidance to prevent complete
arbitrariness."232 Without that authorization, the board could not
prevent the landowner from building his bowling alley house.

226. Id.
227. See id. at 162-63.
The basic criterion for design review under the ordinance is harmony with
existing structures and terrain. This standard does not adequately circumscribe
the process of administrative decision nor does it provide an understandable
criterion for judicial review. It vests the design review committee ... with
too broad a discretion, and permits determinations based upon whim, caprice
or subjective considerations. Harmony of design and appearance is conceptual.
A proposal which is considered harmonious and appropriate by one person
may be deemed displeasing by another. A standard which permits such
evaluations does not meet the test of certainty and definiteness required of
zoning regulations.
Id.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
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Id. at 163.

379 N.E.2d 1144 (N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 1146.
Id. (Citation omitted).
Id.
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The Illinois Court of Appeals has also dealt with architectural design
ordinances which, like that in Bernardsville, tried, but failed, to give the
reviewing authority sufficient guidance to prevent arbitrary actions. In
Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, the landowner
applied to build a single-family house in a subdivision. 233 The landowner was denied a building permit "because the proposed construction
was 'architecturally similar' to other buildings in the area."234 The
ordinance recited "that 'excessive similarity, dissimilarity or inappropriateness in exterior design and appearance of property' adversely affects
the desirability, stability, economic and taxable value, and the like, of
nearby property. " 235 The court concluded that the ordinance "fails to
prescribe adequate standards to control the actions of the Architectural
Advisory Committee in determining whether or not an application shall
be approved or disapproved, and confers too broad a discretion on the
Committee in this regard. "236
The same result was reached in R.S.T. Builders, Inc. v. Village of
Bolingbrook. 237 This time, the proposed single-family house was
rejected as being architecturally dissimilar to its neighbors; the design
review committee "wanted shutters put on the windows, lights on the
outside, aluminum siding, a brick veneer front, and a two-car garage. "238 The court found that the ordinance which authorized the
committee to make such demands was, like the ordinance in Pacesetter,
"unconstitutionally vague and indefinite."239 It "completely fails to
prescribe adequate standards to control the actions of the Committee."240 Like Pacesetter, the ordinance conferred "too broad a discretion on the Committee."241
Were there a template for making aesthetic judgments, these cases
would not arise. But architecture is an art; is creative, not formulaic; it
is individual and temporal. As Robert Venturi noted in a twenty-fifth
anniversary discussion of the house he built for his mother, "[w ]hat

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

244 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 373.
489 N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, (1986).
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id.
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seemed extraordinary then seems ordinary now---or vice versa. This
kind of misreckoning occurs especially in matters of taste where we see
yesterday in the context of today and through the eyes of today."242
Perspectives and tastes change. What seemed startling or grotesque or
appalling may now seem solid and beautiful and even totemic; what then
seemed admirable and comfortable now seems weak and flimsy. 243
Robert Venturi understands that in architecture, even in that devoted
to the single-family house, "nothing is final and perfect and that human
beings must give and take a little all the time."244 It is that give and
take, the ambiguity and tension, the complexity and contradiction, those
"oscillating relationships," which give expressive vitality to architecture,245 even that represented by Venturi's mother's house:
Venturi 's education suggested that this house should not be designed to be too
original, though it is, or to make a point, though it does, but to solve real
problems in ways that communicate both questions and answers. It is only
now, with the passage of three decades, that certain things become clear. Its
design is both straightforward and idiosyncratic, ideological and witty, and
visionary and practical. . . . The simplicity of its front elevation masks its
intellectual complexity. ' 46

Venturi 's exaltation of pluralism over purism is not irresponsible; it does
not encourage esoteric or intolerant or dogmatic architecture. 247 He
did not argue against one canon of taste merely to replace it with

242. Robert Venturi, Mother's House: 25 Years Later, in MOTHER'S HOUSE: THE
EVOLUTION OF VANNA VENTURI'S HOUSE IN CHESTNUT HILL 34 (Frederic Schwartz ed.,
1992). See also Robert Venturi, A/var Aalto, in A VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra
note 104, at 60, where Venturi discusses the work of another architect: "Like all work
that lives beyond its time, Aalto's can be interpreted in many ways. Each interpretation
is more or less true for its moment because work of such quality has many dimensions
and layers of meaning."
243. See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 155. "Buildings, like people, should not
be judged at the moment of birth. They need time to establish themselves in their
surroundings, time for their inhabitants to occupy them and for the newness to wear off
Unlike books, completed buildings should be a little dog-eared before they are
reviewed." Id. Earlier, the author noted that, "it can no longer be taken for granted that
buildings will last. What appears to be an admirable and provocative architectural
statement today may be shown with the passage of time to have been a misguided and
flimsy attempt at novelty." Id. at xvi-xvii.
244. SCULLY, supra note 215, at 229.
245. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 20.
246. Schwartz, supra note 161, at 14.
24 7. See COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 17 ("The recognition
of complexity in architecture does not negate what Louis Kahn has called 'the desire for
somplicity.' But aesthetic simplicity which is a satisfaction to the mind derives, when
valid and profound, from inner complexity."); see also Venturi, supra note 153, at 105
("The aesthetic pluralism of our society encourages an expansive scope for architecture
at the same time that it discourages approaches that are esoteric, intolerant, and
dogmatic. It encourages realism as well as idealism; it projects the architect as follower
as well as leader.").
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another. There can not be, nor should there be, a universal touchstone
for art; that would give us sterility, not vitality. 248
Venturi is the proponent of inclusion, not exclusion; of individual
design rather than total control. He views architecture as a language
with a grammar and syntax, with images and concepts, with the capacity
to recall shared images and project new ideas. He is "a polyglot who is
not settled to any particular linguistic tradition and who might very well
carry on his correspondence in a number of languages, picking the best
words from each source." 249 Venturi finds meaning in what is built;
he expresses meaning in what he builds. 250 And, as John Costonis
recently pointed out, "[w]here there's meaning, there are usually a host
of First Amendment issues lurking nearby."251 Costonis concluded, as
does this Article, that "it is ... clear that legal aesthetics is a more
complicated and risky business than was understood ... in Berman"; the
task now "is to introduce into legal aesthetics the mid-course corrections

248. See VIEW FROM THE CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note 193, at 66-67.
[I]deas ... promoted by Modern architects ... concern aesthetic unity: simple
forms and pure order are the only good, and the architect ... will lead the
community toward these goals. . . . [W]e are ending up with total control---total control through design review boards which promote high design,
exclude popular architecture and in the process discourage quality in any
architecture and stultify the diversity and hierarchy which have always been
part of a balanced and vital community architecture.
Id.; see also VENTURI, supra note 125, at 165 ("Beauty escapes in the pursuit of safety,
which promotes a simplistic sameness over a varied vitality. It withers under the edicts
of today's aging architectural revolutionaries who man the review boards and who have
achieved aesthetic certainty.").
249. Malcolm Quantrill, Venturi: Pragmatism and/or Empiricism, BUILDING, July
21, 1972, at 87.
250. See COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 104.
(I]n some of these compositions there is an inherent sense of unity not far
from the surface. It is not the obvious or easy unity derived from the
dominant binder or the motival order of simpler, less contradictory compositions, but that derived from a complex and illusive order of the difficult whole.
It is the taut composition which contains contrapuntal relationships, equal
combinations, inflected fragments, and acknowledged dualities. . . . In the
validly complex building or cityscape, the eye does not want to be too easily
or too quickly satisfied in its search for unity within a whole.
Id.; see also View from the Campidoglio, supra note 104, at 116 ([Venturi's mother's
house], "though Classical, is not pure. Within the Classical aesthetic it conforms to a
Mannerist tradition which admits contradiction within the ideal order and thereby
enhances the ideal quality of that order through contrast with it. To perceive the ideal
you must acknowledge the real.").
25 l. COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 92.
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indicated by post-Berman experience."252
The next section will
propose a correction which calls for nothing more than the application
of precedent to give the exterior design of a single-family house the
same First Amendment protection given non-obscene live nude dancing.
VI.
As even the brief review conducted above demonstrates, cases
involving municipal aesthetic regulation of single-family houses look
like a quagmire, at least from the bench. Pre-Berman, most courts flatly
said aesthetics were not acceptable as the sole basis for municipal action;
post-Berman, most courts have flatly said that aesthetic determinations
were for the municipalities to make. Pre- and post-, the courts have
elected not to act. 253
The quagmire is that "in the realm of aesthetic regulation," courts
"have no choice but to weigh competing interests; yet there is no unit of
measurement common to the interests being weighed." 254 It is, as one
early analyst pointed out, "a pity that aesthetic disagreements cannot be
resolved by reference to absolute standards, for we should all feel so
much more secure in our judgments."255 However, as a later analyst
concluded:
A legislature will rarely be able to articulate standards, directed toward a purely
aesthetic goal, that will effectively channel the board's decisionmaking; the
agency, by a sequence of adjudications, will rarely be able to construct
meaningful "common law" standards against which subsequent decisions may
be measured for consistency; and procedural devices ... will rarely play any
meaningful role in legitimizing the agency's decision. As a result, there is a
high risk that the agency's judgments will be either beyond the legislative intent
or arbitrary or both. 256

The quagmire becomes even stickier if the exterior design of a singlefamily house is accepted as having First Amendment content. 257
Does the statement that there are no absolute standards mean that there
are no standards at all? Not according to Robert Venturi. He is a
responsible revolutionary, carefully aware that architecture has the power
252. Id. at xvii.
253. See Williams, supra note 142, at 4-5; J. F. Ghent, Annotation, Aesthetic
Objectives or Considerations as Affecting Validity of Zoning Ordinance, 21 A.L.R.3D
1222 (1968); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Zoning
Ordinance Regulating Architectural Style or Design of Structure, 41 A.L.R.3D 1397
(1972).
254. Williams, supra note 142, at 34.
255. J. J. Dukeminier Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 229 (1955).
256. Williams, supra note 142, at 19.
257. See Smith, supra note I 8 I, at 80 I n.42.
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to "enhance or impair" our surroundings, that "the introduction of any
new building will change the character of all the other elements in a
scene."258 Or, as another architect put it, "[i]t is not enough to share
a language; there must be propriety in the conversation."259 And, if
anything, Venturi is an architect of propriety, who knows that "[i]f order
without expediency breeds formalism, expediency without order ...
means chaos," who cautions that no architect "can belittle the role of
order as a way of seeing a whole relevant to its own characteristics and
context."260
Venturi is a revolutionary of revival rather than an iconoclast; he
prefers to
work through analogy, symbol, and image . . . and . . . derive insights,
analogies, and stimulation from unexpected images. There is perversity in the
learning process: We look backwards at history and tradition to go forward; we
can also look downward to go upward. And withholding judgment may be used
as a tool to make later judgment more sensitive. This is a way of learning from
everything. 261

And, in learning from the past, Venturi says architects can develop a
new "[r]hetoric for our landscape" which, "when it is appropriate, will
come from a less formal and more symbolic medium than pure
architecture. " 262 Venturi 's inclusive architecture "rejects that heroic
stance which orthodox modern architecture assumed to itself as the
source of cultural values in favor of a more modest and flexible position

258. Robert Venturi, The Campidog/io: A Case Study, in VIEW FROM THE
CAMPIDOGLIO, supra note l 04, at 12.
259. RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 120, at 90. The author believes that, "builders must
learn the local language---if not, they will be outsiders, architectural tourists. . . . It is
not too fanciful to extend this metaphor and imagine that buildings in groups, sharing
such a language, converse." Id.
260. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 41.
261. VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, at 3; see also RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114,
at 249.
An investigation of classical architecture around the world demonstrates that
universal solutions and local needs can be compatible .... [C]lassicism offers
architects a canon, but it is a liberal and tolerant one. It has provided its
practitioners with an architectural language that is rooted in the past but
adaptable to the present. It is amenable to modification and crossbreeding, and
in talented hands can respond successfully to new building programs. . . . [l]t
lacks the absolutism and rigidity that characterize the modernist approach to
building.
Id.
262. Venturi, supra note 193, at 67.
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in which architecture embodies the values which society, not just other
architects, values and supports."263
Where is the threat in this? For, undeniably, Venturi's words and
works have been considered a threat. A threat to what? To an
established sense of what was expected in architecture; Venturi
transgressed the exclusionist dogma of modem architectural theory by
denying its absolutes.2 64 Although he respected order, he argued that
"[m]eaning can be enhanced by breaking the order; the exception points
up the rule. A building with no 'imperfect' part can have no perfect
part, because contrast supports meaning. An artful discord gives vitality
to architecture." 265 Venturi broke with theories which idealize and
generalize; he created rather than conformed; 266 he brought forward
architecture's "complexities and contradictions of content and meaning";267 he made the viewer a reader of multiple rather than simplistic
levels of meaning. He reacted against conforming rules and regulations,
discarded the confining uniformity, and, in the process, gave his
homeowners liberation and freedom of expression.
What Venturi has done is what the Stoyanoffs and Ms. Reid wanted
to do. He has put what appear to be aliens in the midst of what review
boards consider to be icons. 268 Those terms are John Costonis'. He

263. ROBERT A. M. STERN, NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE 8
(I 969); see also RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at xvi (noting that, "the task of evaluating
the success or failure of a building is not an easy one. A building succeeds------0r
fails------0n many different levels: as a practical object as well as a beautiful one, as a
work of art, but also as a setting for life.").
264. See Levine, supra note 108, at 56; see also VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125,
at 53.
These [images) show the vitality that may be achieved by an architecture of
inclusion or, by contrast, the deadness that results from too great a preoccupation with tastefulness and total design ....Allusion and comment, on the past
or present or on our great commonplaces or old cliches, and the inclusion of
the everyday in the environment, sacred and profane-these are what are
lacking in present-day Modern architecture. We can learn about them from
Las Vegas as have other artists from their own profane and stylistic sources.
Id.
265. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 41; see also James
Steele, The House as Microcosm and Macrocosm, in VENTURI, SCOTT BROWN &
ASSOCIATES ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 15 (I 992) (noting Venturi's "tendency to 'impair
the perfection' of Modernist norms" in his housing designs).
266. See VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, at 129.
267. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 25.
268. See COSTONIS, supra note 88, at 53-54.
Architects, urban designers, and others who double as publicists for their
creations comprise another group of tastemakers. . . . Robert Venturi [is]
among these two-hatters. As designers they shape images that debut as aliens
and, with time, struggle, and luck, may end up as icons. . . . As publicists
they find themselves caught in the squeeze between the instinct for creativity
native to their craft and the anxious conservatism of groups fearful of
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defines icons as "features invested with values that confirm our sense of
order and identity."269 Aliens "threaten the icons and hence our
investment in the icons' values."27° For Costonis, aesthetic laws are
justified by "our individual and social needs for stability and reassurance
in the face of environmental changes that we perceive as threats to these
values." 271 Such laws are justified if assigned a "role as a regulator
of change in the symbolic environment."272 However, to be consonant
with the First Amendment values, such regulation "will be shaped by an
evaluation of the community's claims that icon and alien actually are
dissonant and that this dissonance truly threatens (poses a 'clear and
present danger' to) the stability of the community's land use pattems."273
Architecture is entitled to First Amendment protection; in the case of
a single-family house, it is entitled to the same protection as Ms. Gilleo
was given in posting her sign. The exterior design of the house is
speech; it can be read by its viewers. The landowner's choice of an
exterior design cannot be suppressed simply because a municipality finds
it grotesque or appalling or unsightly. If that is the objection, then the
viewers must simply tum their heads.
That is what the Supreme Court said about those who might have been
offended by Harold Spence's peace symbol flag which he hung from the
window of his apartment in Seattle. That is also what the Court said
about those who were offended by the films being shown at Richard

environmental change.

Id.
269. Id. at xv-xvi.
270. Id.
271. Id. at xv.
272. Id. at 19.
Icons always precede the legal regime that shelters them. Law [does not
createJ ... the powerful bonds between these icons and their constituencies.
Law entered the picture only when summoned by these constituencies .... [A)
profile of the icon's character affords a framework for identifying aliens even
in advance of their appearance because the aesthetics regime's focus is the
dissonance between the two.
Id. at 58.
273. Id. at 99. "First Amendment values are not put at risk by the menace that
aliens pose for icons. On the contrary, these values are threatened by the government's
effort to forestall that menace by censoring 'offensive' aliens, some of which do merit
constitutional status as speech." Id. at 94.
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Erznoznik's drive-in theater in Jacksonville, Florida. 274 A municipal
ordinance prohibited "exhibiting a motion picture, visible from public
streets, in which 'female buttocks and bare breasts were shown. ,,ms
When challenged, the municipality argued "that it may protect its
citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that may be offensive."276
In response, the Court said that "when the government, acting as
censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits its power."277 A municipality may shield
citizens from speech only upon a showing that "substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."278
However, "[t]he plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of
expression, 'we are inescapably captive audiences for many
purposes' " 279 :
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral,
sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather ... the burden
normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes. " 280

Jacksonville's ordinance did not "satisfy the rigorous contitutional
standards that apply when government attempts to regulate expression."281 The ordinance lacked the essential "precision of drafting and
clarity of purpose" to pass First Amendment scrutiny. 282
When a municipality seeks, in the guise of aesthetic regulation, to
regulate the First Amendment speech represented by the exterior design
of a single-family house, it should be required to do two things: first,
provide narrow, clearly defined aesthetic standards by which architects,
landowners, reviewing agencies, and courts can evaluate a proposed
design; and, second, when called to account for rejecting a proposed
design, provide reasons for its action, reasons which relate directly to
furthering a sufficiently substantial municipal interest. It is not enough

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

340

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
at 206.
at 208.
at 209.
at 210 (quoting Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
at 210 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
at 210-11 (quoting Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. at 21) (alteration in original).
at 217.
at 21 7- I 8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for a municipality to say that it does not like what the structure says; it
must show that the message measurably affects a sufficiently substantial
municipal interest. 283 This is no more than what Schad required the
municipality to do when it tried to ban non-obscene live nude dancing.
There is no constitutional place for a municipality's aesthetic
inquisition conducted because it believes the exterior design of a singlefamily house located on private property reflects an architectural
heresy. 284 The "urge to enforce similarity" must "be supplanted by an

283. Compare Sheldon E. Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the
Judicial Decision Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176, 177 (I 970):
The reluctance of courts, as well as certain segments of the public, to accept
aesthetics as the sole basis for zoning stems from a reverence for the historic
rights of private property. Put in the least favorable light, aesthetic zoning
may be considered as the exercise of the police power to restrain an individual
in the use of his private property so that the community may have the luxury
of gazing upon pleasant surroundings. Many feel that the property owner
should not be compelled to bear the financial burden of making the community
beautiful but instead that the community itself should pay for preserving the
beauty of the community. In addition, judges and laymen alike look with
disfavor upon the uncertainty caused by the use of aesthetic standards in
drafting legislation. Certainly it is not an idle fear that the lack of precise
standards may lead to discriminatory enforcement.
(citations omitted) with Dukeminier, Jr., supra note 255, at 236:
If we want our children to grow up in pleasant purlieus, we must give up
something of the freedom of the individual to use his land as he chooses. This
is inherent in the concept of land planning by community officials. Nevertheless, I do not wish to leave the impression that I think it either necessary or
desirable that community officials be arbiters in all questions of aesthetic
preference which crop up from the use of land. According to our basic social
hypothesis, they should interfere only when individual use seriously hampers
the achievement of community goals. If community officials instigate an
artistic inquisition, it is certainly the court's duty to oppose it, but the cases do
not suggest that community officials have acted rashly in attempting to
improve appearances.
284. See Steinbach, supra note 283, at 186.
Certainly beauty can be established without cheese box uniformity for an
entire community. Yet, aesthetic concepts incorporated in construction and
zoning ordinances impinge on individual freedom to utilize property in a
manner contrary to the will of the community. Perhaps today's nonconformity, which may be termed architectural heresy, may be tomorrow's
orthodoxy. As such, it should have its place within today's plan for the
implementation of aesthetic considerations in zoning.
Id.; see also Bret Rappaport, As Natural Landscaping Takes Root We Must Weed Out

Bad Laws-How Natural Landscaping and Leopold's Land Ethic Collide With
Unenlightened Weed Laws and What Must Be Done About It, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
865 (1993).
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anti-assimilation principle."285 There must be "a shift from the goal
of uniformity to an ideal of equivalence," an ideal which "captures the
essence of a relationship in which two things maintain their essential
differentness while asserting a compelling claim to equal significance
and respect. " 286
A demand that municipalities provide narrowly and clearly defined
aesthetic standards is not a demand for castles in the air. It can be done.
It must be done to avoid unreviewable exercises of municipal discretion.
This is illustrated by Anderson v. City of lssaquah. 287 The landowner
sought a permit for a commercial building on Gilman Boulevard in
Issaquah, Washington. Although the building conformed to all other
zoning regulations, the landowner, despite repeated efforts over nine
months and the expenditure of $250,000, was unable to satisfy the
review board that his proposal was "sensitive to the unique character" of
Gilman Boulevard, a street which the review board described as
lssaquah's "Signature Street."288
The board acted under an ordinance designed "to protect, preserve and
enhance the social, cultural, economic, environmental, and aesthetic
values that have established the desirable quality and unique character
of Issaquah."289 The remainder of the ordinance was no more specifUltimately, the aesthetic argument against natural landscaping is illogical.
One man's weed is another man's rose. To some, pink plastic flamingoes,
polka-dotted bloomered cardboard ladies, twirling plastic sunflowers, astro-turfcovered front stoops, and perfectly sculpted evergreens look simply ridiculous;
but to others, such landscaping is beautiful. People have a right to astro-turfcovered stoops, closely cropped evergreens, and spinning plastic sunflowers in
their yards. That is the American way. But individuals also have the right to
a natural stone walkway, free-flowing native shrubs and forbs, and real
sunflowers reaching to the sky in a blaze of gold.
(Citation omitted). Id. at 927.
285. Fitzgerald, supra note 90, at 2065-66.
286. Id. at 2066; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2350 (1995), reversing a state order requiring parade organizers
to include a group imparting a message with which the organizers disagreed:
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people,
grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal
to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has
no more certain antithesis. While the law is free to promote all sorts of
conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for
no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.
(Citations omitted). Earlier, the Court had noted that "this use of the State's power
violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message." Id. at 2348.
287. 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
288. Id. at 748.
289. Id. at 748-49 n.3.
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ic. 290 The court found that "these code sections 'do not give effective
or meaningful guidance'to applicants, to design professionals, or to the
public officials ... who are responsible for enforcing the code."291
Those charged with enforcement "were left with only their own
individual, subjective 'feelings' about the 'image of Issa~uah' and as to
whether this project was 'compatible' or 'interesting."'29
The court concluded that the sections under consideration were
unconstitutional on their face. They were also unconstitutional as
applied to the landowner. 293 The court insisted that "[a] design review
ordinance must contain workable guidelines," guidelines which the
amicus curiae brief-submitted by three architectural societies---<lemonstrated could be established in a municipal ordinance. 294
Although acknowledging that "aesthetic standards are an appropriate
component of land use governance," the court said such standards
can and must be drafted to give clear guidance to all parties concerned.
Applicants must have an understandable statement of what is expected from
new construction. Design professionals need to know in advance what
standards will be acceptable in a given community. It is unreasonable to expect
applicants to pay for repetitive revisions of plans in an effort to comply with the

290. As the court noted:
an ordinary citizen reading these sections would learn only that a given
building project should bear a good realtionship with the Issaquah Valley and
surrounding mountains; its windows, doors, eaves, and parapets should be of
"appropriate proportions", its colors should be "harmonious" and seldom
"bright" or "brilliant"; its mechanical equipment should be screened from
public view; its exterior lighting should be "harmonious" with the building
design and "monotony should be avoided." The project should also be
"interesting." ... "Harmony in texture, lines, and masses (is] encouraged."
Id. at 751 (citation omitted) (quoting I.M.C. 16.16.060).
291. Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae).
292. Id. at 752.
293. The court found that the:
commissioners enforced not a building design code but their own arbitrary
concept of the provisions of an unwritten "statement" to be made on Gilman
Boulevard. The commissioners' individual concepts were as vague and
undefined as those written in the code. This is the very epitome of discretionary, arbitrary enforcement of the law.
Id.

294. Id. at 754. The court said the amicus brief "well illustrated" that "aesthetic
considerations are not impossible to define in a code or ordinance." Id. at 753. The
appendices to the brief included portions of municipal ordinances which: "contain
extensive written criteria illustrated by schematic drawings and photographs. The
illustrations clarify a number of concepts which otherwise might be difficult to describe
with the requisite degree of clarity." Id. n. 14.
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unarticulated, unpublished "statements" a given community may wish to make
on or off its "signature street". It is equally unreasonable, and a deprivation of
due process, to expect or allow a design review board ... to create standards
on an ad hoc basis, during the design review process. 295

This Article has argued that the First Amendment content of the
exterior design of a single-family house requires a municipality to
narrowly and clearly articulate the aesthetic standards to be used in
evaluating the proposed design; the First Amendment also requires that
the municipality carry the burden of demonstrating that the denial or
conditioning of a building permit is necessary to "further a sufficiently
substantial government interest."296 When First Amendment interests
are implicated, the courts cannot apply the usual deferential analysis
which places the burden on the party challenging the regulation to prove
that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. 297 When
a municipality applies aesthetic standards to deny or restrict a private
landowner's construction or alteration of a single-family house, the
burden properly rests on the municipality to justify its interference by
adequate evidence of a substantial governmental interest being advanced
by the application of narrow, clearly defined standards.

VII.
Robert Venturi believes that to be vital as well as valid, architecture
must embrace "contradiction as well as complexity."298 He has
demonstrated in his writing and his buildings that variety is preferable
to conformity, that "there is room for, and need for," a "catholicity of
... taste" in our landscape. 299 Our landscape should "embrace

295. Id. at 755.
296. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
297. See id.
298. COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 16; see also Scully,
supra note 115, at 10.
Many species of high quality can inhabit the same world. Such multiplicity
is indeed the highest promise of the modern age to mankind, far more intrinsic
to its nature than the superficial conformity or equally arbitrary packaging
which its first stages suggest and which are so eagerly embraced by superficial
designers.
Id.

299. Venturi, supra note 193, at 66.
A connoisseur of music will pride himself on the catholicity of his taste....
Why will this person accept in his own living room ... what he will not
accept in the landscape? . . . Why will he condemn pop architecture and
accept pop music? . . . [T]here is room for, and need for, a hierarchy of
musical forms in our lives. Why not the same thing for architectural forms in
our landscapes?
Id.

344

[VOL. 33: 291, 1996]

Constitutional Architecture
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

continuity and discontinuity ... clarity and ambiguity, cooperation and
competition, the community and rugged individualism." 300
Although arguing that architecture has "no fixed laws," Venturi
acknowledges that "not everything will work in a building or a city"; the
architect "must determine what must be made to work and what it is
possible to compromise with, what will give in, and where and
how." 301 His argument favoring architectural complexity and contradiction has extended architecture's vocabulary. The resulting "freedom
from consistency and the opportunity for diversity ... are important:
inherent in them is sensibility to place, time, and culture, and recognition
of the multiplicity and relativity of tastes." 302 Venturi's "return to a
more traditional language in architecture" has given architects "a great
deal more freedom to make richly expressive buildings with individual
character" and "has produced evocative and eloquent public buildings."101
Language and architecture are related, inextricably. Venturi, in
recognizing that, saw that it was "time to stop groping for a universal
language, admit the confusion and start working to make a 'rich mix' of
the polyglot .... " 304 He gave "architectural thinking the most angular
shove it had received in half a century: away from beautiful, unitary,
abstract form, toward linguistic variety and an ironic, mildly dandified
awareness of history and how to quote it."305 His shove did not create
a domino effect leading to architectural anarchy: "Unity is not meant to
be easy, ... nor is diversity synonomous with disintegration. Difference
is as great a civic virtue as justice, faith or grandeur." 306
Venturi is a responsible revolutionary, reviving lessons from the past
rather than simply razing a current ideology. His "architecture of
complexity and contradiction has a special obligation toward the whole,"
embodying "the difficult unity of inclusion rather than the easy unity of

VENTURI ET AL., supra note 125, at 20.
COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 41.
VIEW FROM THE CAMPODOGLIO, supra note 104, at 108.
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 265.
Fowler, supra note 117, at 433.
Hughes, supra note 116, at 57, see also Christian Norberg-Schulz, Less or
More, ARCHITECTURAL REV., Apr. 1968, at 257 (noting Venturi's "substantial
contribution to the development of an architectural grammar").
306. Herbert Muschamp, Democratic Decorations at Bard College, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1993, at H42.
300.
30 I.
302.
303.
304.
305.
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exclusion."307 Venturi's buildings have an "authenticity of ... linkage
to their respective environments, combined with which they constitute
a 'perceptual whole. '" 308
For many, including me, Venturi's position is most clearly expressed
in his single-family houses. It is in this work that Venturi most clearly
communicates his love of the art, his respect for the client, and his
sensitivity toward the community. 309 His houses are meant to be
inhabited and made alive by those who live within, who infuse a
particular site with their presence, their activities, their possessions, their
aspirations, and their dreams. 310 His houses are a delight for occupant
and viewer, houses which, in not seeking to be revolutionary, have
sparked a revolution. 311
That revolution was one for tolerance and accomodation; for
acceptance of variety in what is considered acceptable in the exterior
design of single-family houses; for recognition of that design's capacity
to speak on behalf of the inhabitants. Venturi celebrates, as did the
Gilleo Court, our culture's "special respect for individual liberty in the
home," a principle which "has special resonance when the government
seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there." 312 What this
Article has argued is that the house's exterior design has the same ability
to speak as did Ms. Gilleo 's 8.5 by 11 inch sign protesting the Gulf
War. That exterior design, like that sign, is "an important and distinct
medium of expression" which can "both reflect and animate change in
the life of a community" and which can "provide information about the

COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION, supra note 92, at 16.
VON Moos, supra note IOI, at 13.
See Goldberger, supra note 150, at H27.
See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 120, at 171.
See R YBCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 287.
The concern that the architect shares with the artist is beauty. . . . But
beauty is not reserved only for masterpieces. It is----or should be-present in
all works of architecture. . . . Architectural beauty-perhaps delight is a better
word-often has an everyday quality that is undramatic but precious.
Id.; see also Denise S. Brown, On Houses and Housing, in VENTURI SCOTT BROWN &
ASSOCIATES ON HOUSES AND HOUSING 10, 13 (1992).
Looking back on [Venturi's mother's] house in the context of the heroic and
original late Modernism of the 60s . . . we realise its most significant
characteristic might be that it looks like a house. It is not original, not heroic,
but rather, conventional and ordinary, in it specific, not implicit, references.
In not being revolutionary it is astonishingly revolutionary.
ID.
312. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1994).
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
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identity of the 'speaker"' to "an audience that could not be reached
nearly as well by other means." 313
When a municipality seeks to restrict that speech, it should be held to
the standard applied in Schad where the zoning ordinance sought to ban
non-obscene live nude dancing; "when a zoning law infringes upon a
protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a
sufficiently substantial government interest."314 And, as in Schad, the
burdens of production and persuasion should be placed on the municipality.31s
We must remember that a house is more than a shelter. 316 It is a
statement for the people who live there, an expression for themselves
and to others of who they are and how they choose to live. It is an
expression made as clearly as if written or spoken and just as clearly
entitled to First Amendment protection.

3 I 3. Id. at 2045-46; see also Paul Goldberger, Moore's House Divided, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1994, at Cl ("To build a house, the architect Charles Moore once wrote, 'you
bind the goods and trappings of your life together with your dreams to make a place that
is uniquely your own."')
314. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). A municipality
may act to control the secondary effects generated by otherwise protected First
Amendment activity if the "ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental
interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication." City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
3 I 5. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 71.
[W]hen the government intrudes on one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "this Court must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Because the ordinance
challenged . . . significantly limits communicative activity within the
[municipality], we must scrutinize both the interests advanced by the
[municipality] to justify this limitation on protected expression and the means
chosen to further those interests.
Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977)).
3 I 6. See R YBCZYNSKI, supra note I 20, at 66-67, describing
the unique nature of the art of building, an art of compromise which unites the
beautiful with the practical, the ideal with the possible, the ephemeral with the
concrete. . . . Unlike [other creative endeavors] which produce objects in
space, buildings contain space. Moreover, it is space that is intended not only
to be experienced and admired but also to be inhabited. Making space is a
social art; and although architecture consists of individual works, these are
always parts of a larger context---0f a landscape, of other buildings, of a street,
and, finally, of our everyday lives.

347

